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THE FINANCIAL PROVISIONS OF TIE NEW
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
Part II
RICHARD 0. KUMMERT*
Continuing the analysis of the new Washington Business Corpor-
ation Act begun in the April 1966 issue of the Review, Professor
Kummert explores and compares the asset distribution regulations
under the new and old acts.
B. Regulation of Asset Distributions
1. Payment of Dividends From Sources Other Than Stated Capital.
Under the old act,316 cash or property dividends could be paid only
from317 the "surplus of the aggregate of... [the corporation's] assets
over the aggregate of its liabilities, including in the latter the amount
;Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S., 1953, Illinois Insti-
tute of Technology; M.B.A., 1955, Northwestern; LL.B, 1961, Stanford Law School.
The author wishes to thank Mr. Michael D. O'Keefe, C.P.A. and member of the
third-year class of University of Washington School of Law, for his invaluable re-
search assistance and comments. Errors herein, of course, are the sole responsibility
of the author.
" As numerous footnote references therein attest, it was contemplated in the first part
of this article, 41 WrAsH. L. REV. 207 (1966) (hereinafter cited as part I, 41 WASH.
L. REV. 207, -) that the remainder would appear in a single concluding part.
However, because of the breadth of the subject here considered and publication dead-
lines, the remainder has been split into parts II and III. Part I references to
Nimble Dividends, Dividends by Wasting Asset Corporations, Reductions of Cap-
ital, Share Redemptions and Purchases, Share Dividends, and Director and Share-
holder Liability as appearing in part II should therefore be read as referring to
part III. Part III, hopefully containing the conclusion, will appear in a subsequent
issue of the Review.
" The "old act," following the terms of reference adopted in the first part of this
article, refers to the UNIFORM BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT, now codified as WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 23.010.010-.970 (1958). THE UNIFORs BUSINESS CoRPoRATION ACT adopts
substantially the provisions of the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT (hereinafter
referred to as "Uniform Act") prepared by the National Conference of Comniis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1928. See
9 U.L.A. 115 (1957).
" The words "from" in the old act and "out of" in the New Act are misleading
to the extent that they suggest that the cash or property paid out is to be withdrawn
from surplus (old act), or earned or capital surplus (New Act). Cf. HATFIELD,
SURPLUS AND DIVIDENDS 24 (1943). Under double entry bookkeeping, the payment
of a dividend in cash or property reduces two accounts: the debit balance account
representing the cash or property actually paid out, and one of the credit balance
accounts relating to the owners' interest in the corporation. The object of the terms
"from" and "out of" is the permissible credit balance account to be charged in con-
nection with the distribution. Such terminology will be used in this article because
it is codified in the statutes.
[ 119]
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of its capital stock ... .,,318 The New Act 319 permits, subject to various
limitations, distribution of assets to shareholders out of earned surplus,
as a primary source, and out of capital surplus, as a secondary
source.2 ' Cash or property dividends may be declared and paid freely
out of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus of the corporation, 321
except (1) when the corporation is insolvent before such payment or
would be rendered insolvent by such payment; 2 (2) when such
dividends would be contrary to restrictions in the articles; 3 3 or (3)
when the net assets of the corporation after such payment would not
equal the aggregate preferential amount payable to shareholders of
preference shares in the event of voluntary liquidation.32 4
Cash may be distributed out of capital surplus by action of the
directors solely to discharge cumulative dividend rights of preferred
shares, and then, only if the corporation has no earned surplus, the
distribution is identified as a payment of cumulative dividends out of
capital surplus, and the corporation is not insolvent before such pay-
ment and will not be rendered insolvent by the payment.25 Apart from
this limited exception, cash or property may be distributed
320 out of
'WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(4) (a) (1958).
In accord to the citation conventions established in Part I, 41 WAsH . L. REv.
207, 213 n.32, unnumbered paragraphs in the new provisions will be referred to as "ff"
with numbers in order of their appearance. The New Aces paragraph numbers(in parentheses) will be used whenever they appear.
I1 The New Act refers to the new Washington Business Corporation Act, adopted
March 20, 1965, Wash. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 53. See part I, 41 WASH. L. RvM. 207 n.l.
The New Act is based substantially upon the provisions of the MODEL Busnmqs
CoapORATIoN ACT, hereinafter referred to as the "Model Act," prepared and revised
by the Committee on Corporation Law of the American Bar Association. Differences
between the New Act and the Model Act not discussed in any part of this article are
listed in part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. 207 n2.
" For general background on the basic dividend limitations in the New Act,
see part I, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 207, 234-38. See also Garrett, Capital and Surplus Undcr
The New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 239, 242 (1958):
The theory of the Model Act is that net assets will provide for the claims of
creditors ahead of shareholders; that stated capital xvill provide for the permanent
investments of shareholders; that capital (or paid-in) surplus will represent, in
the first instance, a portion of the investments of shareholders that is less per-
manent but subject to special protective rules; that earned surplus will represent
the accumulated and undistributed profits; that upstream transfers from earned
surplus to capital surplus or stated capital should be largely discretionary with
the board of directors, but downstream transfers should generally require the
approval of shareholders; and that the whole purpose of the formula and restric-
tions accompanying it is to state when and under what circumstances corporate
assets can be distributed to the shareholders.
"1WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 1, (1) (1965).
" WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 1 (1965).
"
2 WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 f 1 (1965).
1"'WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965). For arguments that the preference
limitation should not apply to dividends from earned surplus, see text accompanying
note 390 infra.
" WAsH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430(2) (1965).
" WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.08.420, .430 (1965), following the approach of Model
[ VOL. 42: 119
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capital surplus only if authorized by the articles of incorporation or
the majority of all shares outstanding, and if all cumulative dividends
accrued have been paid, the corporation is not insolvent before such
payment and will not be rendered insolvent by the payment, share-
holders are notified of the source of the distribution, and the remaining
net assets will exceed the aggregate preferential amount payable in
the event of voluntary liquidation to shareholders of preference
shares.
2 7
a. Statutory Definitions. While the old act does not define the term
"aggregate of assets," it does define the word "assets" to mean all of
the corporation's property and rights of every kind.328  Aggregating
assets suggests reaching a total value or amount; but as to the process
by which that action is to be undertaken, the old act offers only limited
assistance. In the process, proper allowance for depreciation and
depletion sustained and for losses of every character must have been
made. 32 ' Deferred assets and prepaid expenses must have been written
off at least annually in proportion to their use. 331 In addition, un-
realized appreciation in value or revaluation of fixed assets must be
excluded if the surplus is to be used for a cash or property dividend.'
Finally, profits on treasury shares before resale,3 2 unrealized profits
due to increase in valuation of inventories before sale,333 unaccrued
portions of unrealized profits on notes, bonds or obligations for the
payment of money purchased or acquired at a discount, except where
such instruments are readily marketable,334 and unaccrued or unearned
Act §§40, 41, refer only to distributions out of earned surplus as "dividends;" dis-
tributions out of capital surplus are simply distributions. The difference in termin-
ology is part of an attempt by the draftsmen to place capital surplus distributions in
a category distinct from dividends from earned surplus. See Hackney, The Financial
Provisions of The Model Business Corporation Act, 70 H~Av. L. REv. 1357, 1384
(1957). In addition, the terminology is in accord with modern accounting usage.
See, e.g., Muo & WALDEN, AccouNTINa THEORY AND PRACTICE-INTERMEDIATE
53S (1960); PYLE & WHITE, FUNDAMENTAL ACCoU"NNG PRINCIPLES 486 (4th ed.
1966). For purposes of comparison with the old act, capital surplus distributions
will be considered under the general heading "Payment of Dividends From Sources
Other Than Stated Capital" despite the technical inaccuracy so committed.
zWASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.430 (1)-(5) (1965).
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.010(11) (1958).
WASH. REV. CODE§ 23.01.250(3) (1958).
' WASH. REV. CODE §23.01.250(3) (1958) adds the phrase "as may be deter-
mined by the board of directors" to the sentence in text
W'VAsH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(4) (a) (1958). However, unrealized apprecia-
tion in value of fixed assets could be used under the old act as a source for share
dividends. WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(4) (b) (1958).
WASH. REv. CODE §23.01.250(5) (a) (1958).
WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01250(5) (b) (1958).
=WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(5) (c) (1958). This section goes on to state that
if the instruments are readily marketable, they may be taken at their actual market




portions of unrealized profits in any form whatever must be excluded if
the surplus is to be used for a cash dividend. 3
The old act does not define the term "aggregate of liabilities." "Cap-
ital stock" is defined in the old act as the aggregate amount of the
par value of all allotted 336 shares having a par value plus that portion
of any consideration agreed to be given or rendered for no par shares
which has been determined by the directors to be payment for such
shares .33
7
The New Act defines "earned surplus" as: 338
the portion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the balance of its net
profits, income, gains and losses from the date of incorporation, or from
the latest date when a deficit was eliminated by an application of its
capital surplus or stated capital or otherwise, after deducting subsequent
distributions to shareholders and transfers to stated capital and capital
surplus to the extent such distributions and transfers are made out of
earned surplus. Earned surplus shall include also any portion of surplus
allocated to earned surplus in mergers, consolidations or acquisitions of
all of substantially all of the outstanding shares or of the property and
assets of another corporation, domestic or foreign.
Earned surplus may be reserved under the New Act, and hence be un-
available for dividends, through a simple resolution of the directors to
that effect;"3 9 but the directors can also abolish the reservation in the
'WAsH. REV. CODE § 23.01.250(5) (d) (1958). For a possible explanation as to
why property dividends can be declared from the various types of unrealized appre-
ciation noted in this subsection while cash dividends can not be, see note 455 infra.
"' For a discussion of the term "allotted," see part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. 207, 239
n.189.
'WAsH. REv. CODE §§23.01.010(10), 240(1) (1958). Surplus, defined to include
unrealized appreciation in value of fixed assets, is also used in the old act to limit a
corporation's right to declare share dividends. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(4)
(b) (1958). On this subject, see text infra part III under the heading "Share
Dividends."
-"'WAsH. REV. CODE § 23A.04.010(12) (1965). With respect to the last sentence
of the definition, see WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.170 11 3 (1965) which empowers
directors to allocate any amount that would otherwise be capital surplus in connec-
tion with share issuances in a merger or consolidation or in acquisition of all or
substantially all of the outstanding shares or of the property or assets of another
corporation, to earned surplus provided that the issuing corporation's resulting
earned surplus will not exceed the sum of the earned surpluses of the issuing corpora-
tion and of all corporations merged or consolidated or of which the shares or assets
were acquired. See also text discussion accompanying note 424 infra.
With respect to transfers of earned surplus to stated capital, see WASH. REv. CODE§ 23A.08.170 1 4 (1965) authorizing the directors to do so by resolution. See also
WASH. REv. CODE §23A.08.150 1 5 (1965) involving such a transfer in connection
with a conversion of shares.
On transfers of earned surplus to capital surplus, see WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130
ff 2 (1965), allowing such transfers on resolution of the board of directors.
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 ff 4 (1965), allowing such reserves for "any pur-
pose or purposes." This power is presumably subject to the broad limitations upon
directors' power mwt to declare dividends. See generally City Bank Farmers Trust
[ VOL. 42: 119
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same manner. 4 ° A restriction of earned surplus under the New Act
results from the purchase of treasury shares.3 4 1 The restriction lasts
only so long as the shares are held as treasury shares, for it is removed
pro tanto upon the disposition or cancellation of any such shares.3
The New Act defines surplus as all of the corporation's surplus
other than earned surplus. 43 "Surplus" is defined as the excess of the
net assets of a corporation over its stated capital.144 "Net assets" is
defined as the amount by which the corporation's total assets, excluding
treasury shares, exceed its total debts.34 And, finally, "stated capital"
is defined as the sum of (a) the par value of all issued shares of the
corporation having par value, (b) the amount of consideration received
for no par shares allocated to stated capital, and (c) any other trans-
fers to stated capital, less all reductions permitted by law.346
In addition to its general definition of capital surplus, the New Act
on a number of occasions specifies that certain transactions will or may
have an effect on that account. Thus, the act states that capital
Co. v. Hewitt Realty Co., 257 N.Y. 62, 177 N.E. 309 (1931) (dicta); LATTIN,
CoRoRATioNs 459-61 (1959).
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.16.130 f 4 (1965) also states that reserved earned surplus
shall not be available for the payment of dividends or other distributions by the
corporation except as expressly permitted by this act. It appears that no use has
been made of the exception in the New Act, unless it was thought that depletion
reserves were reserves of earned surplus. Cf. 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 40 (a) ff 4.03;
2 MODEL AcT ANN. § 64 %J 4. It should be noted that if dividends were declared by the
directors from reserved earned surplus, their action would probably be sufficient under
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 1 4 (1965) to remove the surplus from its reserved
status.
:" WAsH. REV. CODE § 23A.16.130 1f 4 (1965).
' WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.030 fI 2 (1965).
Ibid. For a discussion of the operation of the restriction, see text infra part
III under the heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
A corporation's unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus not only determines
the propriety of its cash or property dividend declarations, WASH. REv. CODE §
23A.08.420(1) (1965), but also determines its right to purchase its own shares,
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 1 1 (1965), and, in part, to declare dividends of its
own shares. WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420(4) (1965). See text discussions infra
part III under the headings "Share Redemptions and Purchases" and "Share
Dividends," respectively.
:WASH. REV. CODE §23A.04.010(13) (1965).
u"WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(11) (1965). Unreserved and unrestricted sur-
plus determines a corporation's right to declare share dividends. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 23A.08.420(4) (1965), and text discussion infra part III under the heading
"Share Dividends." Surplus may also be transferred to stated capital in connection
with a conversion of shares. WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.150 1 5 (1965).
c'VWIVAs. REV. CODE § 23A.04.010(9) (1965). The term "net assets" is used in
connection with preference protection provisions appearing in WASH. REv. CODE
§§ 23A.0S.420(1) (1965) (cash or property dividends from earned surplus or current
earnings), 23A.08.430(4) (cash or property distributions from capital surplus) and
23A.16.090 (redemption or purchase of redeemable shares). See text discussion infra
at note 386 (earned and capital surplus distributions) and part III under the
heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
For the definition of treasury shares, see part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. 207, 224 n.94.
"'IWASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(10) (1965).
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surplus arises on the sale of par value shares for more than par 47 and
may arise from the sale of no par shares.348 It also arises if surplus is
created by or arises out of a reduction of stated capital'4 or if earned
surplus is transferred to capital surplus by directors' resolution. ; °
Capital surplus is decreased, of course, by a distribution from it to the
shareholders.3 5' It may also be decreased by transfers to stated capital
(1) for share dividends, 5 2 (2) in connection with a conversion of
shares, 5 ' (3) by directors' resolution,3 4 or by its application to a
deficit "arising from losses." ' Finally, capital surplus will be re-
stricted in the event of purchases or acquisitions of treasury shares
where such use has been authorized by article provision or shareholder
approval.3 5
6
The New Act defines insolvency as the inability of a corporation to
pay its debts as they become due in the usual course of its business. 7
b. Operation of Basic Dividend Limitations. A careful examination
of the statutory limitations and definitions should reveal that both
acts fail to articulate the crucial premise from which the fund available
for dividends under each act may be computed."' The old act requires
"'"WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.170 ff 1 (1965). See also, for a special example.
WASH. REV. CODE: § 23A.08.150 1 5 (1965), dealing with conversion of shares.
It is not clear why the directors under WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.150 f 1 (1965).
should not have the authority to allocate the excess of consideration received over
par value directly to stated capital if they so choose. The New Act does permit
directors to transfer capital surplus to stated capital by resolution and hence the final
result can be obtained in two steps if desired. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.170
f 4 (1965).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.170 1 2 (1965). See also, for a special example W.v-n.
REv. CODE § 23.08.150 ff 5 (1965), dealing with conversion of shares.
"WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 1 (1965).
' WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 2 (1965).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.4301T 1 (1965).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 (4) (1965).
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.09.150 1 5 (1965).
'WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.170 f 4 (1965).
'WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 ff 3 (1965). Capital surplus may be applied to
losses only after all of the corporation's earned surplus has been exhausted.
"WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 1111 , 2 (1965). Use of capital surplus for such
purpose generally is authorized by article provision or by the affirmative vote of the
holders of at least tvo-thirds of all shares entitled to vote on the question. See
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 11 1 (1965). However, WASH. REV. CODE: § 23A.08.03011 3 (1965) apparently authorizes use of capital surplus for certain types of purchases
even if such authorization is not received. See text discussion infra part III under
the heading "Share Redemptions and Purchases."
' WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(14) (1965). Insolvency is a limitation upon
purchase of or payment for a corporation's own shares, WASH. REV. CODE § 23A 08.030
11 4 (1965), cash or property dividends, WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 1 1 (1965),
distributions of cash or property from capital surplus, WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.430(1) 11 2 (1965), and redemption or purchase of redeemable shares, WASH. REv. CODE§ 23A.16.090 (1965). The term is also used in WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.28.170 (2) (a),(b) (1965) relating to jurisdiction of superior courts to liquidate corporations in actions
by creditors.
' This statement of the issue appears in Hackney, Accounting Principles in
[ VOL. 42 : 119
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computation of an aggregate of assets, and provides a few rules as to
how this process is to be accomplished. But how should assets be
valued for purposes of this computation? Consider, for example, the
amounts owed by customers to the corporation. Need these items be
included at all? If so, should they be included at face value, the
amount the corporation could reasonably expect to collect, or the
amount the corporation could receive on a sale of the accounts in
liquidation?" 9 Similar valuation problems exist under the New Act's
definitions of capital and earned surplus. To calculate capital surplus,
total assets must first be computed; yet no valuation principle is
stated.""' Moreover, even though earned surplus is defined with ref-
erence to the corporation's income statements,361 it is necessary, be-
cause of the reciprocal relationship between a corporation's balance
sheet and its income statement,362 to decide how the corporation's assets
will be valued so that its income can be determined.
No case under either the old provisions or the Model Act's predeces-
sors to the New Act has faced the issue.6 3 However, each of the acts
Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 791, 801-02 (1965), and 2 BONBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 918-20 (1937).
"" For a discussion of the appropriate value standard under the old act, see note
364 infra. On the valuation of receivables issue raised in text, see 2 BONBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 961, 964-65 (1937) ; Greenough and Ayer, Funds Available
For Corporate Dividends in Washington, 9 WASE. L. REv. 63, 82-83 (1934).
As Gibson, Surphs, So What?, 17 Bus. LAw. 476, 487 (1962), states:
If "surplus" has this vital role in corporate policy, the average prudent director
may well inquire what surplus is. The Model Act reassuringly informs him that
it is the "excess" of net assets over stated capital.
But how do net assets exceed stated capital? In length, breadth, or thickness?
[Footnote omitted.]
"" Earned surplus could have been defined in the New Act in either of two ways:
(I) from balance sheet data, viz., as net assets less stated capital and capital surplus,
with comprehensive statutory definitions for the latter two terms; or (2) from in-
come statement data, viz., as a corporation's cumulative net income less permissible
deductions from such accumulation. See Hackney, The Financial Provisions of
7he Model Bushess Corporation Act, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1365-66 (1957). The
New Act's definition of earned surplus seems to adopt the income statement approach.
WASH. REv. CODE §23A.04.010(12) (1965). Further verification of this conclusion
may be found in the facts that the definition was derived from a definition of
earned surplus formulated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
see Hackney, supra at 1366, that the New Act provides that capital surplus is the
remaining surplus after deducting earned surplus from the amount equal to net assets
less stated capital, WASH. Rrv. CODE § 23A.04.010(11), (12), (13) (1965), and that
the draftsmen's comments make clear reference to income accounts in connection with
the computation of earned surplus. See Comment appearing in 1 MODEL ACT ANN.
§40(a) 1 4.02(3); see also comment appearing in 1 MODEL AT ANN. §2 ff 4.06.
" See, e.g., MONTGOMERY, AUDITING 426 (7th ed. 1949) ; de Capriles, Modern Finan-
cial Accounting (Part II), 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 49 (1963); York, Relation of the
Income Statement to the Balance Sheet and Earned Surplus Ana ysis, 71 J. AccouNT-
ANey 43 (1941). See also Nelson, The Relation Between The Balance Sheet and
The Profit-and-Loss Statement, 17 ACCOUNTING RM. 132, 141 (1942) ; Storey, Cash
Movements and Periodic Income Determination, 35 ACCOUNTING REV. 449, 452 (1960).




contains several provisions implying that the valuations suggested by
generally accepted accounting principles are particularly relevant in
determining the fund available under each for dividends.' G These
implications are buttressed by the commentators' observation that
"' The old act's specific prohibition of unrealized appreciation in value or re-
valuation of fixed assets and unaccrued portions of unrealized profits generally as
sources for cash dividends, WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(4) (a), (5) (1958), probably
were in accord with accounting principles at the time the old act was drafted.
See AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING RE.FARCH BULL. No. 5(1940); AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AcCOrNTING RE-
SEARCH BULL. No. 43, p. 11 (1961) referring to the 1934 Institute rule forbidding
recognition of unrealized profits in the income account. [The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants was formerly known as the American Instiute of
Accountants. Bulletins issued by both will hereinafter be cited as AICPA RE-
SEARCH BULL. No.- , p.- (date).] PATON & LITTLETON, AN INTRODUCTION TO
CORpORATE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 62-63 (1940). See generally A Symposium on
Appreciation, 5 ACCOUNTING REV. 1 (1930). And, of course, the rules that allowance
must be made for depreciation and depletion sustained and that write-offs of deferred
assets and prepaid expenses must be made annually in proportion to use, WASH. REV.
CODE § 23.01.250 (3) (1958), substantially restates accounting rules then in effect. See,
e.g., PATON & LITTLEToN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
67-68, 73-74 (1940); SANDERS, HATFIELD & M,1OORE, A STATEmENT OF ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES 75-76, 114 (1938). Finally, the requirement that losses of every character
be recognized is also reminiscent of the conservative accounting rules developed after
the great depression. See, e.g., CANNING, THE ECONOMICS OF ACCOUNTANCY 134
(1929); FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING INTERMEDIATE 154 (6th ed.
1965).
Greenough & Ayer, Funds Available for Corporate Dividends in IWashington, 9
WASH. L. REv. 63, 64 (1934), in connection with a thorough study of the old
provisions, state the following:
Section 24 presupposes a working knowledge of accounting and any discussion
of the legal implications of the section must, perforce, utilize principles and
terms borrowed from that field. However, it is not the purpose of this paper to
emphasize a study of accounting concepts. It is intended, rather, to confine dis-
cussion of accounting practice to such as is necessary to allow an intelligent
treatment of this section of the Uniform Act.
Perhaps the reader will question the stress laid upon the views of accountants
in relation to some of the topics in this discussion. Accounting precepts are
not legal precepts, but there is today in the law a decided tendency on the part
both of courts and of legislators to embody accounting principles in the law.
It is, therefore, fair to assume, particularly where there is a paucity of case
law, that courts will be influenced by the view of the accountant.
[Footnote omitted.]
The first sentence of the New Act's definition of earned surplus was derived from
a definition formulated by the Committee on Terminology of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, see Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Uses
in the Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 436 (1952); AICPA
RESEARCH BULL. No. 9, p. 75 (1941), after discussion of the problem by the American
Bar Association draftsmen with members of the Institute. See Garrett, Capital and
Surplus Under 77ze New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEIrP. PROB. 239,
258 (1958). As Hackney, The Financial Provisions of 77ze Model Bnsiness Corpora-
tion Act, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1366 (1957), points out, the New Act's adoption of the
accountant's definition of earned surplus "argues strongly that just as accounting
today is mainly concerned with the fairest possible presentation of periodic net
income, regarding the balance sheet merely as a connecting link between st'ccezsive
income statements, so earned surplus as used in the act is intended to signify a
composite income statement from the year of inception and not simply a balance-
sheet increase in net assets." In 1949, the Committee on Accounting Procedure of
the American Institute of Accountants approved as an "objective" the discontinuance
of the word "surplus" in corporate accounting and suggested that "retained income,"
f VoL. 42 :119
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courts interpreting less directive language in other dividend statutes
have relied heavily upon accounting principles."' It therefore would
"retained earnings," "accumulated earnings," or "earnings retained for use in the
business" be used in place of earned surplus. AICPA, COMMTTIEE ON TERMINOLOGY,
ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY BULL. No. 1, 1111 65-69 (1953). Garrett, Capital and Surplus
Under the New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 239, 258 (1958),
states that the ABA Committee on Business Corporations considered the new
terminology in connection with drafting the Model Act but that it decided the
term "earned surplus" had come into disrepute among accountants because it had
not been legally defined, that it could be defined in an accounting sense, and that
there was no substantial difference between surplus as defined in the Model Act and
the terms proposed by the accountants for their own use. He further states that -de
accountants' committee conceded that the term "earned surplus" was more appropriate
in a statute. To the same effect is Seward, Earned Surphs-Its Meaning and Use
in the Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435 436-37 (1952).
Also, the new provisions relating to carryover of earned surplus in corporate
acquisitions, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.04.010 (12), 23A.08.170 (1965), see discussion
in text accompanying notes 427-35 infra, which were adopted in view of recent
changes in accounting thought and with the intent of accommodating modem ac-
counting procedure. See Gibson, Surplts, So What? 17 Bus. LAW. 476-83 (1962).
Finally, under WASH. Rr~v. CODE § 23A.08.450 ff 3 (1965) directors are exonerated
from liability for unlawful dividends if they can show good faith reliance upon
financial statements stated in a written report by independent accountants to reflect
fairly the financial conditions of such corporation.
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450 II 3 (1965) further provides that directors relying
in good faith upon financial statements of the corporation represented to be correct
by the president or the officer of the corporation having charge of the books of
account will be exonerated. It also exonerates them if they in good faith consider
assets "to be of their book value" for purposes of determining the amount available
for dividend. For a discussion of the operation of these provisions, see part III
infra under the heading "Director and Shareholder Liability." Gibson, Surplus,
So What?, 17 Bus. LAW. 476, 487 (1962), argues that the book value clause in WASH.
REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 if 3 (1965) should be interpreted to mean that a director will
not be personally liable for illegal dividends if he believes in good faith that the
assets have a "value" at least equal to the amount stated on the books. From this he
concludes that "value is obviously the governing standard" under the Model Act.
(To the same effect see Seward, Earned Surphs-Its Meaning and Use in the
Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 438 (1952).) Gibson implies
in his later discussion that value for this purpose means worth-value. The book
value clause can also be interpreted as consistent with the notion that the valuations
intended were those produced by generally accepted accounting pr-nciples. Becalise
of the emphasis in modem accounting upon cost allocation and income determination
rather than balance sheet worth-values, many accounts appear on corporate balance
sheets as valuations having no relationship to their worth-value. See the extended
discussion in Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Statutes, 30 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROD. 791, 803-13 (1965). Directors should be protected not only when
relying on financial statements prepared by independent accountants in accord with
generally accepted accounting principles, but also against the charge that assets
valued by generally accepted accounting principles were not actually worth that
value. Gibson's argument will be discussed further in text accompanying note 454
infra.
One of the comments to §40(2) of the Model Act (substantially equivalent to
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 (1965), may also indicate that accounting principles
were not intended to be the valuation standard: "even without an express insolvency
restriction, the limitation of dividends to surplus covers a bankruptcy insolvency."
As is pointed out in note 368 infra, this statement either misconstrues bankruptcy
insolvency as being computed from accounting values or indicates that surplus is to
be computed from present fair values, the bankruptcy test standard.
-'See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIoNS 529 (1946); 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF
PROPERTY 919-20 (1937) (discussing cases under the capital impairment doctrine);
HILLs, THE LAW or ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 163 (1957); MAY,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 38-39, 86-102 (1946) ; REPORT OF STUDY GROUP ON BUSINESS
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seem that a court faced with an interpretation problem relating to
legality of dividends under either act should look first to the result
suggested by generally accepted accounting principles. But its task is
then ended only if the general purpose for collecting and assembling
the accounting data, meaningful disclosure of the financial condition of
an enterprise, has not rendered the accounting result inappropriate in
view of the basic policy underlying dividend regulation, fair accomo-
dation of the interests of creditors and shareholders as a group and
inter se.366 If the accounting result is inappropriate, the statutory
implications of its relevance must yield to the overall purpose, and a
solution consistent with that purpose must be sought.
It may well be asked whether any reliance should be placed upon
accounting valuations in making legal determinations as to the avail-
able dividend fund as against, for example, using current values for
such purposes. Moreover, assuming that reliance on accounting data
is necessary, it may still be asked whether its extent should be made
clear in the statute. These questions can be better answered after a
comparison of the operation of the basic dividend limitations imposed
by both acts in a number of classic dividend situations.0
(1) Declaration of Payment of Cash Dividends by Insolvent Corpor-
ations. Apart from the possibility that its surplus test for dividends can
be said to subsume the bankruptcy test for solvency36 (that the fair
INcOME 25-28 (1952) ; Baker, Hildebrand on Texas Corporations-A Rc'icw. 21
TEXAS L. REv. 169, 190 (1942) ; Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation
Law, 30 LAW & CoNTEmP. PEOn. 791, 818 (1965); Hills, Model Corporation Act,
48 HARV. L. Rav. 1334, 1349 n.12 (1935); Weiner & Bonbright, Theory of Anglo-
American Dividend Law: Surphs and Profits, 30 COLU-m. L. REV. 330, 338 (1930).
" See in this regard HERWITz, BUSINESS PLANNING (1966) ; BALLANTINE, CORPORA-
TiONS 529 (1946) : "It should be noted, however, that the courts have the last say and
tend to follow on legal questions, as between conflicting accounting opinions, what
will further the legal objective in view."
" The approach here followed is suggested by BAKER & CARY, CASES ON
CORPORATIONS 1172-73 (3d unabr. ed. 1958); Hackney, The Financial Provisions of
the Model Business Corporation Act, 70 HARv. L. REV. 13-57, 1371-84 (1957) ; Latty,
Uncertainties In Permissive Sources of Dividends Under Present G.S. 55-116, 34 N.C.L.
REv. 261 (1956) ; and by general matters of statutory interpretation raised by both acts.
3 BAKER & CARY, CASES ON COROATIONS 1247 (3d unabr. ed. 1958) state: "In
states having a true balance sheet surplus or capital impairment test, it would seem
that an insolvency test in the bankruptcy sense is superfluous, as assets by definition
exceed not only all debts but also capital." This statement assumes that a true
balance sheet test would use worth-values (as the bankruptcy test does, see, e.g.,
I COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 1.19, at 110 (14th ed. 1966) for if it used accounting
values there would be no necessary correlation between the tests. See Hackney,
Accounting Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 791, 803-13
(1965) as to why accounting values do not approximate worth-values. Since courts
interpreting the old act's surplus test are likely to use accounting values, see text
discussion supra at 358, the chances that it will encompass the bankruptcy insolvency
test are at best remote.
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value of a corporation's assets must exceed its debts),"' the old act
makes no reference to dividends endangering solvency. °70 However,
Washington's fraudulent conveyances act3 '1 would apparently render
voidable dividends paid by a corporation whose assets had a present
fair salable value less than the amount that would be required to pay
its probable liability on existing debts as they became matured and
absolute.17 ' The New Act, in contrast to the old, expressly prohibits
declaration or payment of cash dividends resulting in a corporation's
being unable to pay its debts as they become due (the equity test of
insolvency), regardless of the existence of sufficient earned3 73 or capital
surplus 374 to support the dividend.
Three questions can be raised with respect to the adoption of the
C See 11 U.S.C. § 1(19) (1964); 1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY ff 1.19 (14th ed. 1966).
' The Commissioner's Note to § 24 of the Model [Uniform] Business Corporation
Act (see note 316 supra) is clear in its reference of the problem of dividends by
insolvent corporations to fraudulent conveyances law. See 9 U.L.A. 170 (1957) and
text following this note. As to the possibility of the surplus test encompassing the
bankruptcy solvency test, the Commissioner's Note is not particularly clear:
In a few statutes, the only provision is one with respect to dividends paid while
the corporation is insolvent or causing insolvency. The rule that dividends
must be paid out of capital is not the same as the rule that dividends must not
be paid by an insolvent corporation, for even an insolvent corporation may earn
profits, but these profits should be used in paying debts. Conversely, a corpora-
tion may be quite solvent and yet have no profits, and may, therefore, be unable
to pay dividends. (M echem, § 1343.)
It is interesting to note that the Ohio statute upon which the old act dividend pro-
vision was modelled contained a prohibition against dividends causing equitable
insolvency. See Ohio Sess. Laws 1931, vol. 114, § 8623-38(c), at 62.
11 See generally WASH. REv. CODE §§ 19.40.010-.130 (1958). The Uniform Act has
been adopted by twenty-three states. See listing in 9B U.L.A. 45 (1957, Supp. 1965).
"',Section 4 of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act ("every conveyance
made. .. by a person who is or will be thereby rendered insolvent is fraudulent as to
creditors without regard to his actual intent if the conveyance is made . . . without
a fair consideration"; see WASH. REv. CODE § 19.40.040 (1958)) has been interpreted
to apply to dividends by insolvent corporations as that term is defined in text.
See Powers v. Heggie, 268 Mass. 233, 167 N.E. 314 (1929). Section 5 of the act,
relating to conveyances without fair consideration leaving the transferor with un-
reasonably small capital, may also apply to such dividends. See WASH. REv. CODE
§ 19.40.050 (1958). Where a conveyance without fair consideration is fraudulent as
to a creditor, he may, when his claim matures, have the conveyance set aside to the
extent necessary to satisfy his claim or disregard the conveyance and attack or levy
execution on the property conveyed. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.40.090 (1958).
In the event of bankruptcy, several provisions in the Bankruptcy Act may apply
to dividends paid by insolvent corporations: (1) section 67(d), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)
(1964), which incorporates the essential portions of the Uniform Fraudulent Con-
veyances Act and other provisions designed to supplement and mesh with other parts
of the Bankruptcy Act; (2) section 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964), which vests
in the trustee the bankrupt corporation's title to its property, including the corpora-
tion's rights against shareholders for improper dividends; and (3) section 70(e)
11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1964), which voids as against the trustee any transfer which
under any federal or state law is fraudulent or voidable for any reason by any
creditor. See generally BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CoRaoRATIoNs 1175-76 (3d unabr.
ed. 1958).
"3 WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420 f 1 (1965).
' 'WAsn. REv. Con § 23A.08.430(1) (1965).
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new provisions: (a) was it necessary, in view of the existing fraudulent
conveyances statute, to add a prohibition in the corporation statute
against insolvency dividends? If so, (b) what is now to be the relation-
ship between the statutory remedies? and (c) was the proper definition
of insolvency chosen? Adding the equitable insolvency test to the
dividend statute appears to have been worthwhile since it will impose
liability for dividends declared or paid during equitable insolvency
upon the directors, 37 5 who may be easier for creditors to sue and more
at fault than the shareholder-defendants in a fraudulent conveyance
suit.3 70 Moreover, the definition of insolvency adopted tends to give
more protection to creditors than the definition used in the fraudulent
conveyance statute. 7
In view of the corporation statute's specific, more recent treatment
of the problem,37'8 and its possible implication that shareholders are not
to be directly liable to creditors or the corporation on illegal divi-
dends, 379 the question may be raised whether the corporation statute
ought to be the exclusive remedy relating to dividends by insolvent
corporations. However, there is no evidence that either the drafts-
men 380 or the members of the legislature were aware of the possible
overlap between the provisions of the two statutes, and hence any
inferences of intent drawn from the new provision itself are scarcely
compelling. Moreover, the New Act's remedy may leave creditors with
unsatisfied judgments in a number of situations where fairness would
dictate tha: shareholder-recipients should be liable, and where the
fraudulent conveyances act would so hold. 8 ' It would seem that the
' Under WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450(1) (1965), directors of a corporation
who vote for or assent to the declaration of any dividend or distribution of its
assets to its shareholders contrary to the provisions of the act shall be jointly and
severally liable to the corporation for the amount of the improper distribution.
Directors found liable under WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.450 (1) (1965) are entitled
to contribution from the shareholders receiving the distribution who know the
distribution was in violation of the act. For further discussion of director and
shareholder liability and defenses thereto, see text discussion infra part III under the
heading "Director and Shareholder Liability."
'The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act allows recovery only from the
transferee, not the corporation's directors. See WASH. REv. CODE § 19.40.090 (1958)
BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1175 (3d unabr. ed. 1958).
Inability to pay current obligations as they mature has been held insufficient
to establish insolvency under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act. See McCarty
v. Nostrand Lumber Co., 232 App. Div. 63, 248 N.Y. Supp. 606 (1931).
See, e.g., on this general theme, CRAwFoRD, CoNSRucrION OF STATUTES § 230,
at 430 (1940).
"See statutory remedies discussed supra note 375; WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.03.
450(4) (1965).
'The annotations and comments to the Model Act predecessor to WASH. REV.
CODE § 23A.08.450 (1965) make no mention of the fraudulent conveyance act recovery
possibilities. See 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 43 f f 2, 4.
ss Consider, for example, a dividend payment by a corporation insolvent under
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best resolution of the conflicting interpretations would harmonize the
operation of the statutes while giving due weight to the fact that the
corporate remedy is later and more specific-i.e., would treat the
corporation statute as the primary mode of recovery, but would pre-
serve to creditors a secondary line of possible recovery under the
fraudulent conveyance act in the event of unsatisfied primary judg-
ments.
The final question is whether the definition of insolvency should have
been broadened to include the bankruptcy, as well as the equity, test
of insolvency.112 This proposal would in effect force directors to go
beyond the current assets-liabilities matching process, required under
the equitable test, into more difficult determinations as to whether the
fair value of all the corporation's assets exceeds the amount of its
debts. 31 3 Despite obvious computation problems, such a requirement
seems warranted as a necessary means of protecting long-term credi-
tors of the corporation," 4 particularly since the insolvency limitation
both the equity and fraudulent conveyance tests where the directors are judgment
proof. Creditors may be able to reach some of the shareholders in these circumstances
by a creditors' bill upon the directors' statutory right of contribution from knowing
shareholders. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.450(4) (1965); Sussex Trust Co. v.
Bacon, 11 Del. Ch. 380, 102 Atl. 785 (1917). However, fairness would seem to demand
that the creditors be preferred here even to shareholders without knowledge.
-2At least four states use the dual definition of insolvency. See CAL. CORP.
CODE § 1500; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(c) (1), (2) (1965) ; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23,§ 37(a) (2) (1959) ; OKLA. STAT. ANNi'. tit. 18, § 1.133 (1953).
For general background of insolvency tests in connection with dividend regulation
statutes, see KEEL, COR'ORATE DIVIDENDS 33-41 (1941).
It should be noted that Bonbright, after a careful study of the definition of in-
solvency under the Bankruptcy Act, concluded that neither the equity test (because
it would declare a debtor insolvent even though his inability to pay his debts was
temporary) nor the bankruptcy test (because its value standard was almost meaning-
less) was acceptable. He offered as a definition that a person is insolvent if he
cannot fairly be expected, if left to his own devices, to pay off his debts within a
reasonable period of time. 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 788 (1937). This test
seems to obscure the valuation factor and seems as hard (if not harder) to apply as
the bankruptcy test. The bankruptcy test is urged in text because it is a relatively
common supplement to the equity test and because it seems useful to key the dividend
test of insolvency to legal standards with which the directors may be presumed to
be familiar.
' See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 758-63 (1937), for a discussion of the
standard of valuation imposed by the Bankruptcy Act. See also Hackney, Accounting
Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 791, 820-21 (1965), for a
statement of the difficulties in computing the actual value of a corporation's assets.
Compare, however, the court's statement on the problem in Randall v. Bailey, 23
N.Y.S. 2d 173, 184-85 (Sup. Ct. 1940), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942),
quoted in note 560 infra.
As to whether the equity test is harder to apply than the bankruptcy test, see
I COLLIm, BAN RUPTCY f1 1.19, at 92 (14th ed. 1965). For specific problems that might
arise under the equitable test in a corporation statute, see Note, 13 SYRAcUsE L.
REv. 93, 98 (1961). But cf., de Capriles, New York Business Corporatim Law:
Article 5-Corporation Finance, 11 BUFFALO L. REv. 461, 467-68 (1961).
" By and large, the equitable test for insolvency in this context is more effective
in protecting the interests of short-term, rather than long-term, creditors since long-
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is not only used in connection with dividend payments, but is also used
in connection with distributions from stated capitalY8 5
(2) Declaration or Payment of Cash Dividends Endangering Liqui-
dation Preferences. The entire thrust of the old act's surplus test was
toward protection of stated capital;316 hence, to the extent that a
share's liquidation preference was not represented in stated capital,"-,
a preferred shareholder, absent specific contract provisions, could have
no assurance that net assets equivalent to his liquidation preference
would be maintained in the corporation.3 S  In contrast, the New Act
term creditors are more interested in the integrity of stated capital. See de Capriles
& McAniff, The Financial Provisions of the New (1961) New Rbrk Business
Corporation Law, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1239, 1263 (1961). The question thus obviously
becomes how would a bankruptcy insolvency test afford long-term creditors protection
they do not already have in the dividend regulations preserving stated capital.(Cf. the comment in 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 40(a) f 4: "Insolvency as used in the
section applies to either equity insolvency or bankruptcy insolvency. Even without
an express insolvency restriction, the limitation of dividends to surplus covers a
bankruptcy insolvency.") The answer once again lies in the fact that if accounting
valuations are used to determine asset values for purposes of determining funds
available for dividends under the surplus tests, a corporation may have both earned
and capital surplus but still be insolvent under the fair value bankruptcy test. See
note 368 supra; BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1247 (3d unabr ed. 1958,
listing the special case of watered stock. (See, on the latter situation, discussion at
text accompanying note 543 infra.) Even though it is thus clear that protection of
long-term creditors requires addition of the bankruptcy insolvency test, it may be
argued that such creditors should be left to protect themselves by contract against
such exigencies. The protection here afforded, however, seems so fundamental that
it should be available to all creditors and not only those with alert counsel.
It may be argued that the bankruptcy test imposes too great a burden on directors.
But it seems hard to believe that avoiding what amounts to an act of bankruptcy
in connection with a corporate dividend is an unreasonable requirement. Moreover,
directors for this purpose will have the extra margin of the capital stock accounts as
protection since the test here looks only to debts of the corporation. See Rett, If'hen
Is A Corporation Insolvent, 30 MicH. L. REv. 1040, 1042 (1932). Finally, the statute
elsewhere seems to have imposed the same burden in connection with the protection
of liquidation preferences. See text accompanying note 386 infra.
As to possible alterations in directors' defenses in connection with a bankruptcy
test, see text discussion infra part III under the heading "Director and Shareholder
Liability."
" WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965), permitting nimble dividends, WASH.
REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(2) (1965), permitting dividends from depletion reserves,
WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.030 (1965), permitting certain purchases of shares from
stated capital, and WArsH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.090 (1965), regulating redemptions and
purchases of redeemable shares, and discussion of each subject in text infra part III.
"' See WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.250(4) (a) (1958), defining surplus as net assets
less capital stock and WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.010(10) (a) (1958), defining capital
stock in terms of par or allocated consideration.
' See, in this connection, the discussion of whether the minimum consideration
for preference shares should be the amount of the preference, part I, 41 WAsH. L. Rrv.
207, 243-45. If it were decided that such minimum consideration was appropriate,
a secondary issue under the Old Act would be whether consideration for preference
shares to the extent of the amount of the preference should be placed in stated capital.
This issue is answered under WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.09.170 (1965).
' In some situations, of course, the stated capital of the common stock, com-
bined with that of the preferred shares, would be sufficient to protect the preferred's
liquidation preference. But without further restrictions on the reduction of capital,
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requires that the net assets of the corporation remaining after a cash
dividend from either earned 3 9 or capital surplus390 must equal the
aggregate amount payable in the event of voluntary liquidation to
preferred shares with a liquidation preference. The full force of the
new provisions can be appreciated only in conjunction with the drafts-
men's comment to the Model-New Act's definition of net assets:391
"Net assets" are not necessarily equivalent to net book value in all cases.
For example, if the actual value of assets has fallen so far below book
value that the directors cannot be shown to have relied in good faith on
their book value current fair values may be the governing standard.
Thus, apart from the uncertain leeway provided by the good-faith
defense, the new provisions apparently impose a super-bankruptcy
insolvency test for dividends wherein the preferred liquidation prefer-
ence is treated as a debt of the corporation.392
see WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.430(2) (1959), a preferred shareholder would have no
assurance that the common stated capital could not be reduced.
It is not clear from the authorities whether or when an equity court would step in
to protect the preferred shareholders in such a situation. In Crimmins & Pierce
Co. v. Kidder Peabody Acceptance Corp., 282 Mass. 367, 185 N.E. 383 (1933), the court
allowed redemption of certain class B preferred shares despite the fact that the
corporation's net assets after the redemption would be less than the par value and
liquidation preference of the Class A preferred. The court said that absent some
statutory indication of such a limitation, it would not imply a preference protection
fur fear of creating a new and different contract than that written by the parties.
Query, however, whether a court faced with a common dividend undercutting the
liquidation preference shortly before liquidation would not come to the rescue of the
preferred. Cf. Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Berle,
Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1060-63 (1931).
-1 See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965). This provision does not appear
in the basic Model Act dividend provision (limiting dividends to earned surplus)
or in its recently adopted alternative provision permitting nimble dividends in ad-
dition to dividends from earned surplus. See 1 MODEL AT ANN. §40(a) 1.
Liquidation preference protection clauses are common as limitations on "nimble
dividends." See 1 MODEL Acr ANN. §40(a) 2.02(1) indicating that all but one of
the states with nimble dividend provisions have at least a liquidation upon earned
surplus dividends. See as the only example N.C. GEN. STAT. 55-50(c) (3) (1965).
Thus, it can be argued that all the Washington draftsmen intended was to add the
usual preference limitation on the nimble dividend clause being added. However,
the language of WAsH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965) ("No such dividend")
would appear to foreclose this argument since it is not sufficiently restrictive so as
to apply to only the second clause of the first sentence.
' 'WASH. REV. CODE §23A.08.430(4) (1965). The text statement is not entirely
accurate as apparently a cash distribution to shares having a cumulative preferential
right to receive dividends can be made from capital surplus even though the
liquidation preference limitation is not met. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430
ff 2 (1965). But before this type of dividend can be declared from capital surplus,
the earned surplus must be exhausted. Ibid. Hence, if one dollar of earned surplus
exists, and the fair value of the net assets does not exceed the amount of the
liquidation preference, no distribution of capital surplus can be made.
, 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 2, 1 0.04(i) (1960, Supp. 1964). See WASH. REv. CODE §
23A.04.010(8) (1965).
" Net assets is defined in WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(9) (1965) as the
amount by which the total assets of a corporation, excluding treasury shares, exceed
the total debts of the corporation. The term "debf' is not defined in the Act but
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The new provision regulating dividends from earned surplus, which
was added by Washington draftsmen to the Model Act's alternative
dividend section,393 is unique in the United States for its rigor. Its
closest competitor, the North Carolina provision, would permit divi-
dends from earned surplus as long as the corporation's net assets
(determined by generally accepted principles of sound accounting
practice) 9 ' exceeded the highest aggregate liquidation preferences of
shares entitled to priority of preference over the shares receiving the
dividend. 95 The North Carolina provision appears to accomodate the
interests of preferred and common shareholders better than either the
old or the new Washington provisions. Both the new and the North
Carolina provisions are superior to those in the old act in their recog-
nition that the fundamental attribute of preferred shares, their senior
liquidation rights, must be protected from possible abuse by excessive
dividends on common shares.396 However, the North Carolina provi-
Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under 77te New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW &
CoNTEmP. PRoB. 239, 243 (1958), indicates that the term was chosen over "liabilities"
because "debts ... [was] the more certain term, because they are ordinarily fixed as
to liability and liquidated as to amount, whereas liabilities connote something
more in the way of contingencies and speculations." This definition of debts may
exclude several items that would be recorded as liabilities under generally accepted
accounting principles. See GRADy, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles, AccoumriNG RESEARcH STUDY No. 7, at 276 (1965) : "all known liabilities
[obligations to pay sums of money, to convey assets other than money, or to render
service] should be recorded regardless of whether a definite amount is determinable";
Moonitz, The Changing Concept of Liabilities, 109 J. Accountancy, May 1960, p. 41,
44: "the amount of the liability must be the subject of calculation or of close estima-
tion". See generally AmoRy & HARDEE, MxrmiIALs ON AccouNTING, 101-28 (3d ed.
1959). Several recent statutes have used the word liabilities so as to include pro-
vision for unascertained obligations and other credit balances not ordinarily thought
of as "debts" but which must be deducted in computing funds available for dividends.
See, e.g., Hackney, The Pennsylvania Bsiness Corporation Law Amendments,
19 U. Plrr. L. REv. 51, 66 (1951), discussing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-2 (Supp.
1956) ; N.C. GEN STAT. § 55-2(7) (1965), defining "liabilities" generally as "all those
debts and claims which either are known to impose a fixed obligation of pay-
ment or, if contingent, have sufficient possibility of becoming fixed as to require in
accordance with generally accepted principles of sound accounting practice an esti-
mate of their probable amount" If one of these broader definitions is used, it will
be necessary to exclude from liabilities capital stock, which might under certain
accounting definitions be included. See Garrett, mepra at 243; Moonitz, supra at 42.
' See note 389 supra.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2(2) (1965).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50(c) (3) (1965). This provision also regulates capital
surplus dividends.
The North Carolina provision thus is designed to cover the problems that may
arise where the preferred's stated capital is not equal to its liquidation preference.
See part I, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 207, 243-45.
" As the Note, Dividends From Contributed Capital and Protection of Preferred
Shareholders, 65 HARV. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (1952), states:
In general, the interests of the preferred which should be protected relate to
its position either as a claimant to dividends or as a claimant to assets. The
preferred is commonly defined as a class having a claim prior to junior shares
to a specified amount of the corporate earnings, and therefore has an interest in
having the corporation maintain an earning power sufficient to assure the satis-
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sion does not seek, as does the new provision, to convert the preferred's
liquidation claim into a debt, and thereby to insulate the preferred
from the risk that the accounting valuations used in determining the
dividend fund would seriously overstate actual worth.397 Such a gross
overstatement, assuming a reasonable amount of stated capital for both
the preferred and common shares, would most likely occur in a precip-
itous decline in the value of the corporation's fixed assets. 9 The New
Act then might prevent dividends even to the preferred despite the
presence of a substantial earned surplus and sufficient current profits
to support the dividend and despite the lack of any threat to creditors.
It is not clear why the preferred, at least, should not be entitled to a
dividend in the circumstances. 99 Thus, it would seem that the new
provisions relating to earned surplus should be modified to conform to
the North Carolina provision.0 °
As the following section will demonstrate, the liquidation preference
protection clause appearing in the New Act's regulation of distributions
faction of this claim. As a claimant to assets, the preferred shareholder is
entitled to at least parity with the common in the final distribution of capital;
an asset preference entitles him to satisfaction of his claim prior to any dis-
tribution to the common shareholders. He is consequently interested in the
prospective ability of the corporation to meet this claim in case of complete
liquidation.
' The North Carolina provision does contain, as was suggested for the New
Act at text accompanying note 398 supra, a provision prohibiting dividends when
the corporation was insolvent in the bankruptcy sense. See N.C. GEbr. STAT.
§55-50(c) (2) (1965).
" This statement obviously begs the question of how generally accepted account-
ing principles deal with substantial unrealized depreciation in values, which is
discussed at text accompanying note 481 infra.
A second possible example would be a situation involving grossly watered stock.
For a discussion of this specific problem, see text accompanying note 543 infra.
- The new test might be explicable if only dividends to junior classes of shares
were prohibited while the actual value of the assets was not equal to the liquidation
preferences of the shares entitled to such preferences. (Compare the operation of
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430 1 2 (1965), regarding dividends on cumulative pre-
ferred shares from capital surplus where no earned surplus exists.) But even if the
new provision had been so limited, it is still not clear why dividends to common
shareholders should depend on meeting the more stringent test of actual value.
"" It is arguable that net assets (valued under generally accepted accounting
principles) equal to the preferred shares' liquidation preference should be maintained
in the corporation and that until the preference aggregate is met, no dividends
should be paid to any class. The North Carolina rule, in contrast, would permit
dividends to be paid to preference shares down to a point where net assets were
zero (assuming the bankruptcy insolvency test was then met). The choice between
these two rules turns in part on the need to maintain in the corporation assets equal
to the liquidation preference in order that the corporation's earning power will be
at least equal to the preferred's dividend claim. However, there is the countervailing
consideration of continuing the preferred dividend as long as possible so that
arrearages do not arise. Since under the North Carolina rule no dividends can be
paid in the junior class until the preference deficit is made up, and in view of the
rather shaky position of preferred arrearages generally, see, e.g., Gibson, How
Fixed Are Class Shareholder Rights?, 23 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 283, 286-92 (1950),
the North Carolina provision appears the better of the two.
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from capital surplus should also be amended to conform to the North
Carolina provision.
(3) Distribution of Cash From Surplus Arising From Capital Con-
tributions in Excess of Legal Mimima.4°' The old act apparently per-
mitted free use of excess capital contributions-paid-in surplus-for
cash dividends, 0 2 irrespective of the class of shares making the con-
tribution, the class of shares receiving the distribution," 3 the existence
of sufficient earned surplus to cover the distribution,'" and the pos-
sibility that shareholders might be misled as to the corporation's profit-
ability by a seemingly regular distribution."' The New Act deals with
... On the possibility of cash dividends from capital surplus arising from the
reduction of capital, see text discussion infra part III under the heading "Reduc-
tions of Capital."
It may be helpful in evaluating the following analysis to note that according to
Accounting Trends & Techniques, published by the AICPA, none of the 600 corpora-
tions surveyed paid a dividend out of capital surplus in 1963 or 1964. See AICPA,
ACCOUNTING TRENDS & TECHNIQUES 223 (18th ed. 1964) ; id at 249 (19th ed. 1965).
"o' See Greenough & Ayer, Funds Available For Corporate Dividends in W1ash-
ington, 9 WASH. L. REv. 63, 70 (1934) ; Weiner, The Asnont Available For
Dividends Where No-Par Shares Have Been Issued, 29 COLUu. L. REV. 906, 916
(1929).
" Some of the most complex questions relating to permissible uses of excess
capital contributions arise in corporations with two classes of stock. See text infra
beginning at note 415; Note, Dividends From Contributed Capital and Protection
of Preferred Shareholders, 65 HAv. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (1952); Note, Declara-
tion of Dividends From Paid-In Svrphs, 31 COLUM,. L. REv. 844, 848-49 (1931).
Although no cases appear to have considered the question, preferred shareholders,
in the absence of protective statutory or contractual provisions, may be able to urge
either a requirement of general fairness, see Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1211 &
n.65 (1952), or a duty on the part of common, majority shareholders to the preterred
minority. See Zahn v. Transamerica, 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) ; Berle, Corporote
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1049, 1060-63 (1931). Cf. Associated
Gas & Elec. Corp., 6 S.E.C. 605, 619 (1940).
The old provision was modelled in Ohio Sess. Laws 1931, vol. 114, § 8623-38.
See Commissioner's Note in 9 U.L.A. 170 (1957). That provision, interestingly
enough, provided that "no dividend shall be paid to the holders of any class ... in
violation of the rights of... any other class...." Ohio Sess. Laws 1931, vol. 114, at
§ 8623-38(f). Compare the language in WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(7) (1958).
relating to dividends by wasting asset corporations, discussed in text infra part
III under the heading "Dividends by Wasting Asset Corporations."
'Although the old act contains no express limitation upon charging dividends
to paid in surplus when earned surplus exists, such limitation is generally recognized
by the accounting authorities. See e.g., BLOUGH, PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF AC-
COUNTING STANDARDS 338 (1957) ; KOHLER, AUDITING 496 (2d ed. 1954) ; R PPAFORT,
SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 16.30-16.32 (2d ed. 1963) ; Katz, Account-
ing Problems in Corporate Distributins, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 764, 766-67 (1941 ). Hence,
because of the incorporation of generally accepted accounting principles as inter-
pretive devices, see text accompanying note 364 supra, it may have been arguable
that earned surplus had to be exhausted before paid-in surplus could be used.
' See, e.g., BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1297 (3d unabr. ed. 1958).
It is again interesting to note that Ohio Sess. Laws 1931, vol. 114, § 8623-38 (d),
required that notice be given to shareholders if dividends were paid from other than
earned surplus. The Louisiana statute, also modelled on the Uniform Act. addted
such a notice provision to the Act. See LA. REv. STAT. § 12:26 (1950).
In connection with the recent amendment of the New York Business Corporation
Law, the report of the bar associations of the City and State of New York urged
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some of these problems in its extensive provisions regulating capital
surplus distributions. Directors may now make distributions from
excess contributions only to shares having a cumulative preferential
right to receive dividends, and then only if the corporation's earned
surplus is exhausted. 0 6 Apart from this limited situation, distributions
can be made from excess contributions only if authorized by the
articles or by an affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of the
outstanding shares of each class, whether or not such shares can
otherwise vote.117 In addition, such distributions can be made only
when all cumulative dividends accrued on preferred shares have been
fully paid, and the net assets remaining at least equal the aggregate
preferential amount payable to the holders of preferred shares in the
event of voluntary liquidation.4 08 All distributions from excess con-
tributions must be identified as distributions from capital surplus.40 9
The policy questions inherent in the changes wrought by the New
Act's provisions can perhaps be best analyzed by comparing them with
the statutory system suggested by Hills in his Model Corporation
Act.4 1" Under Hills' statute, if the corporation had only one class of
stock, cash dividends could be paid out of paid-in surplus only if the
corporation had no earned surplus. If the corporation had a class of
shares entitled to preferential dividends outstanding, dividends from
paid-in surplus could be paid only on those shares. Shareholders were
that the disclosure requirement was not of sufficient importance to justify adding the
notice requirement. It argued that large corporations are protected by the S.E.C.
rules and that the advantages for small corporations were illusory. See N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS'N, COmmiTrEE ON CORP. LAW & Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, COMMITTEE ON CORP. LAW, JOINT REPORT ON PROPOSED NEW YORK Bus. CORP.
LAW 13-14 (1961). The statute finally enacted not only contained the notice require-
ment, N.Y. Bus. CoR. LAW § 510(a) (2), but also provides that failure of a corporation
to comply in good faith with the requirement will make the corporation liable to any
shareholder under ordinary tort liability for any damage sustained. See N.Y. Bus.
CoR. LAW § 520.
As the preceding section makes clear, the old act also did not limit paid-in
surplus distributions where the liquidation preference of the preferred would be
endangered.
"WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.430 f 2 (1965).
"'This language seems to impose a requirement that a majority of the preferred
as a class must approve the distributions from capital surplus. Compare, however,
the language establishing the class voting requirement in WASH. RFZv. CODE §
23A.16.030 (1965) (dealing with prejudicial article amendments), and WASH. REv.
CODE § 23A.20.030 (1965) (dealing With certain mergers or consolidations). It seems
clear that in order for the provision to have any significance in view of relative pre-
ferred-common voting power, a class vote must be required; hence, the New Act should
be amended to provide such a vote clearly.
"" WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.430(2), (3), (4) (1965).
"' WAsH. REv. CODE §23A.08.430(5), ff 2 (1965). All distributions from capital
surplus, as previously noted, see text accompanying note 374 supra, are subject to the
insolvency test.
"' See Hills, Model Corporationt Act, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334 (1935).
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to receive notice whenever a dividend came from a source other than
earned surplus.
Where a corporation has only one class of stock outstanding, the
alternatives thus range from completely free distribution under the
old act, to Hills' intermediate position of free distribution after ex-
haustion of earned surplus but with notice to the shareholders, and
finally to the new provisions permitting distribution with notice if
authorized by article provision or majority vote of the shareholders.
Creditors presumably would prefer that assets equivalent to the paid-
in surplus remain in the corporation to supplement their "cushion" of
stated capital. Shareholders probably desire to be informed in a mean-
ingful way that a distribution is a return of their contribution to the
corporation rather than a portion of the corporation's profits. In ad-
dition, there may well be occasions when the paid-in surplus has been
contributed by one group of shareholders who may prefer to have that
contribution remain in the corporation rather than distributed in part
to shareholders who did not contribute it.412 It would appear that the
best accommodation of the conflicting interests involved can be made
by altering two provisions in the New Act: (1) deleting as a potential
source of abuse the authorization of capital surplus distributions by
article provision,413 and (2) adding the Hills' earned surplus exhaus-
tion provision . 14  The act as so altered would protect the creditors'
"'Id. at 1364. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 1500(c) (same but with no earned
surplus exhaustion clause); N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-50(a)(3) (1965) (no distribu-
tions in one-class case except by partial liquidation; no distributions of capital
surplus to any preference class junior to the contributor); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
32, § 157.41(b) (1954) (same but with no earned surplus exhaustion clause). But
see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.41a (1954) (relating to dividends in partial liquida-
tion) ; MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.22 (1963) (same but with no exhaustion clause):
MiYN. STAT. ANN. § 301.22 subd. 2(2) (1959) (same but with no earned surplus
exhaustion clause); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.132(a) (2) (1953) (no distribu-
tions in one-class case except by reduction of capital; no earned surplus exhaustion
clause).
'See Note, 31 Comuax. L. Rav. 844, 846-49 (1931); Greenough & Ayer, Funds
Available For Corporate Dividends in Washington, 9 WAsH. L. REV. 63, 73 (1934).
"1 The New Act article provision would permit promoters to insert a general
distribution clause in the articles at a time when no outside shareholders existed,
which clause could later be used to the outside shareholders' disadvantage.
Zeff, Legal Dividend Sources-A National Survey and Critique, (II), 31 N.Y.
C.P.A. 802, 805 (1961), suggests that only "relatively large proposed distributions"
of paid-in surplus should require a shareholder vote. While there may be something
to the point that small distributions of paid-in surplus may, because of the share-
holder vote, not be worth the trouble they can cause, a legal standard for de mnilmis
distributions would be virtually impossible to define. Moreover, the need for such
small distributions is not clear.
" It can be argued that the New Act has an implied earned surplus exhaustion
clause because of the incorporation of accounting principles as an interpretive guide
and the accountants' general position toward earned surplus exhaustion as a pre-
requisite to dividends from paid-in surplus. See note 404 supra. However, WASH.
Ry. CoDE § 23A.08.430 (1965) makes specific reference to exhaustion of earned
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interest both by the exhaustion provision and by the need for share-
holder approval in every distribution. And the act would then offer
shareholders maximum notice of the distribution, along with a chance
to approve it.4"
For two-class situations, the alternatives range from completely
free distribution under the old act, to the New Act's intermediate
position of free distribution limited to shares with cumulative preferen-
tial dividend rights, when earned surplus has been exhausted, and
distribution otherwise with notice, if authorized by article provision or
majority class vote, provided that there are no preferred dividend
arrearages, and finally to the Hills' position that no dividends be paid
unless earned surplus is exhausted and then only to preferred shares.
The creditors' interest would appear to be the same as in the one-class
case. Preferred shareholders have an interest in seeing that distri-
butions from paid-in surplus are not made to common shareholders,
regardless of whether the surplus was contributed by the preferred or
common shareholders. If the paid-in surplus arose from preferred
shares, a distribution to the common shareholders obviously defeats
preferred's expectation that its investment would be used permanently
in the enterprise. Even if the common shareholders contributed the
paid-in surplus, however, the distribution would reduce the cushion of
common-share capital otherwise available to the preferred, which the
preferred may have relied upon to protect its asset preference or to
assure its earnings claim. 1 The interests of the common shareholders
appear to be about the same as in the one-class case. The best accom-
modation among the conflicting interests again appears to require mak-
ing three alterations in the New Act's provisions: (1) adding Hills'
surplus as a prerequisite to one type of dividend from capital surplus, those payable by
director action only on cumulative preferred stock. See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.430
f 2 (1965). It thus seems reasonably clear that exhaustion was not desired as a general
requirement to the other distribution possibilities under that section.
,i Shareholders under the New Act as revised would then receive notification of
their need to vote on the issue and the source of the distribution when made.
It seems clear that notices should do more than simply state that the distribution
is proposed or is from paid-in surplus. It should be clear that the funds being
returned represent shareholder contributions, not earnings. It should also contain
reasons for the distribution. See Zeff, Legal Dividend Sources-A National Survey
and Critique (II), 31 N.Y. C.P.A. 802, 805 (1961).
" See BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CoRoATIONs 1297 (3d unabr. ed. 1958) ; Note,
Dividends From Contributed Capital and Protection of Preferred Shareholders,
65 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1204-05 (1952) ; Note, Declaration of Dividends Fromn
Paid-In Surplus, 31 COLUm. L. REv. 844, 848-49 (1931). As the Note, 65 HARV. L.
REv. 1203, 1205 (1952), points out, the advantages of the common vis-a-vis the
preferred accentuate the unfairness of a distribution of paid-in surplus from
common shares to the common shareholders. The common, despite its reduced in-
vestment, would still be in control of the enterprise and would still be entitled to all
appreciation on the assets over the asset preference of the preferred.
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earned surplus exhaustion provision;4 17 (2) providing that in no event
shall surplus paid in by any class of shares be used for the payment of
dividends on any class junior thereto; 41 and (3) providing that divi-
dends and other charges to paid-in surplus shall be applied to surplus
paid in by junior classes of shares first, and only after exhaustion of
such surplus, to surplus paid in by preference shares.41  The act so
altered would protect the creditors' interest with the earned surplus
exhaustion provision, the requirement that paid-in surplus be used
basically for preferred dividends, and the requirement that sharehold-
ers approve other distributions from paid-in surplus. The act would
then seem to offer preferred shares reasonable protection of their
strongest interest in paid-in surplus-their own contribution-while
allowing distribution of paid-in surplus contributed by common shares,
if preferred dividends are current and a majority of the preferred
shares agree to the distribution. This limited flexibility with respect to
common dividends from paid-in surplus seems a better accommodation
of preferred and common interests than the absolute prohibition pro-
posed by Hills.42
Although the policy considerations discussed above relate to excess
"The principal purpose for the earned surplus exhaustion clause in the two-
class case is to prevent payment of the preferred dividend from paid-in surplus with
a later payment of the common dividend from earned surplus, or in other words,
common dividends from paid-in surplus. See BAKM & CARY, CASES ON CORPRxTIONS
1301 (3d unabr. ed. 1958); Note, 65 HAiv. L. REv. 1203, 1209 (1952).
418 Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-50 (a) (3) (1965).
It may be argued that the present New Act provisions provide sufficient protec-
tion to the preferred by means of the class vote requirement. See note 407 supra.
Unfortunately, however, in many circumstances the class vote does not adequately
protect the preferred, see, e.g., Note, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1203, 1213 (1952) ; hence the
provision in text is proposed.
' It may be argued that this proposal imposes a severe bookkeeping burden on
corporations. But, as Hackney, The Financial Provisions of The Model Busines
Corporationr Act, 70 HAav. L. REv. 1357, 1367 (1957), points out, adoption of the New
(Model) Act provisions generally may cause corporations to go back to the date of
incorporation and analyze subsequent transactions with a view to segregating cati .0
from earned surplus. Since this process is required in any event, the additional
requirements of segregating paid-in surplus by source and charging reductions to
appropriate source accounts does not seem overly severe in view of the gains pro-
duced thereby.
' The New Act as revised would seem to produce results in one-class situations
that are in accord with the accountants' views toward dividends from paid-in
surplus. See, e.g., MILROY & WALDEN, ACCOUNTING THEORY & PRAcrTcE-IxTR-
AEDIATE 538 (1960) (equating paid-in surplus with stated capital and requiring
distributions therefrom to be labelled liquidating dividends); LENHART & DEFLLI. V-,
MoNTGoIERY's AUDITING 407 (8th ed. 1957) ("the incongruity of contributing to the
capital of a corporation and then receiving part of it back in the guise of ordinary
dividends should be sufficiently evident to encourage making the practice legally
impossible") ; MAURIETlO, INRmEDIATE ACCOUNTING 483 (1950) ("the board of
directors have [sic] a moral obligation to conserve paid-in surplus by not declaring
dividends therefrom.").
The accounting authorities apparently have not considered the problems in two-
class corporations.
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capital contributions421 rather than to other types of capital surplus, 2
most of the statutes dealing with the problem have applied the pro-
tective provisions to the entire capital surplus.4 13 This extension seems
warranted, particularly in view of the fact that capital surplus, as we
shall see shortly, includes unrealized appreciation.
(4) Declaration of Dividends Out of Surplus Resulting From Declar-
ant's Acquisition for Shares of All or Substantially All of Another Cor-
poration's Assets.42 1 In combination transactions under the old act, the
assets acquired apparently would be recorded at their "fair valua-
tion,"' 4 5 with a credit to the capital stock account for the par or stated
'" Most commentators limit the analysis stated above to capital surplus arising
on the original issue of shares and offer different analysis where the capital surplus
arises from share sales after the corporation has an accumulated earned surplus,
from share issuances in connection with a merger or consolidation, or from a
reduction of capital. See, e.g., Greenough & Ayer, Funds Available for Corporate
Dividends in Washingtoz, 9 WAsH. L. Rxv. 63, 70-73 (1934) ; Note, Declaration of
Dividends From Paid-It Surplus, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 844, 846 (1931). For discus-
sion of the latter two types of capital surplus, see text accompanying note 424 infra,
and part III under the heading "Reductions of Capital."
The argument for different treatment of the second type of excess share contri-
bution--equalization surplus-is that a shareholder buying shares from a corporation
with accumulated earned surplus intends to equalize his share of the surplus ac-
cumulated prior to his entry for the benefit of others. See Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 212 N.Y. 360, 106 N.E. 91 (1914); Berle, Corporate
Devices for Diluting Stock Participations, 31 COLUIMt. L. REv. 1239, 1247 (1931);
Greenough & Ayer, supra at 70; Mason, Profits and Surplus Available for Dividends,
9 AccoUNTING REv. 61, 65-66 (1932) ; Note, 31 CoLum. L. REv. 844, 850 (1931). It is
not clear that any shareholder purchasing from an existing corporation has any
specific intention to have part of his investment be returnable, see LATriN &
JENNINGS, CASES ON CoRPoRATIONS 1147 (3d ed. 1959), nor is it clear how the
equalizing amount is to be determined. See BAYER & CAY, CASES ON COu'ORATIONS
1238 (3d unabr. ed. 1958). Moreover, no American statute presently provides excep-
tional treatment for such surplus. See 1 MODEL AcT ANN. § 41 1 2; BAKER & CARY,
op. cit. supra at 1257. Hence, it seems appropriate that the New Act provisions not
attempt to deal with the subject.
' Examples of the types of transactions that may give rise to non-excess-share-
contribution-capital surplus are donations to the corporation, transactions in treasury
shares, and revaluation of the corporation's assets. On the problem of distributions
from revaluation surplus, see text accompanying note 454 infra. On gains from
treasury shares, see text infra part III under the heading "Share Redemptions and
Purchases."
"See, e.g., Model Act §41; N.C. GEN. STAT. §55-50(a)(3) (1965); Hills,
Model Corporation Act, 48 Hpiv. L. REv. 1334, 1364 (1935).
'This category of transactions is intended to include acquisitions for shares
of substantially all of the shares of another corporation, followed by immediate
liquidation of the newly-acquired subsidiary. For a discussion of the problems re-
lating to share acquisitions where the subsidiary is not liquidated, see text accom-
panying note 514 infra.
" See WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.150(3) & (4) (1958) ; and the draftsmen's com-
ments to WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.170 (1958), appearing in 9 U.L.A. 161 (1957). Con-
sistent with accounting practices of recording purchases at cost, and the general desire
to avoid difficult valuation questions, if the shares issued have a fair market value,
that value in all likelihood will be treated as the value of the assets received. See
HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 782 (1966) One situation where the share value might
not be used is where the proposed issue is so large in relation to the amount of
stock already outstanding that the latter's quoted price would no longer be significant, in
which event the fair market value of the assets would be used. Id. at 784-85.
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value of the shares issued and a balancing credit to paid-in surplus.426
The New Act42 7 gives the board of directors of the acquiring corporation
the choice of recording the combination transaction as under the old
act428 or by carrying forward the acquired corporation's asset values 20
and its earned surplus, to the extent that such surplus is not allocated
to the stated capital of the acquiring corporation in connection with the
shares issued in the combination transactionY.4 3  The significance of the
New Act's changes can best be understood against a background of
current accounting principles relating to combination transactions.
The accountants' current official position, Accounting Research Bul-
letin No. 48, distinguishes between a purchase, in which an important
part of the ownership interests in the acquired corporation is elimi-
nated, or in which other factors requisite to a pooling of interests are
not present, and a pooling of interests, in which the holders of sub-
stantially all of the ownership interests in the constituent corporations
" See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23.01.010(10) (a) & (b), 240(1) & (2) (1958) ; part
I, 41 WASH. L. REV. 207, 253-54.
The Ohio statute upon which the old dividend provision was modelled gave
merging or consolidation corporations the option of carrying over the acquired
corporation's earned surplus. See Ohio Sess. Laws 1931, vol. 114, §§ 8623-38(e).
"= See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.04.010(12), 23A.08.170 1 2 (1965).
42S This result would obtain under WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.08.150, .160, .170 111 & 2
(1965), apart from the overriding effect of § 23A. See Gibson, Surplus, So What?
17 Bus. LAW. 476, 477-80 (1962).
4Z The New Act contains no provision to this effect. However, the Model Act
predecessor provision to WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.170 i 3 (1965) was amended in
1962 specifically for the purpose of authorizing poolings-of-interests, see Gibson,
supra note 428, at 480-83, in which carryover of asset values is a key element. See
text accompanying note 435 infra. Hence, it seems reasonably clear that carryovers
of asset values are now permitted.
It should not be concluded that the value of the acquired corporation's assets can
be ignored entirely in a pooling-of-interests case. The fair value would still be
relevant in determining the adequacy of the consideration for the shares being
issued. See HERwiTz, BUSINESS PLANNING 782-836 (1966); Hackney, Accounting
Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 791, 816-17 & n.73 (1965).
' Although this result, a part of the pooling-of-interest concept, was presumably
intended under the New Act, see Gibson, supra note 428, at 480-83, it is doubtful
that the language in WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.170 ir 3 (1965) accomplishes this in-
tention. WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.08.070 1 3 (1965) refers to amounts of surplus "that
would otherwise constitute capital surplus under the foregoing provisions of this
section." As Hackney, Accounting Principles in Corporation Lazo, 30 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 791, 817 n.74 (1965), points out, this language seems to assume that the
total credit to surplus will be the same regardless of whether purchase or pooling
accounting is used and that the only issue is which surplus account should be
credited. In fact, of course, the total surplus credit can vary greatly between the
two types of accounting because of the difference in asset values recorded, see
Hackney, Financial Accounting For Parents and Subsidiaries-A New Approach
to Consolidated Statements, 25 U. PnTT. L. REv. 9, 14 (1963), and there could well
be occasions when the surplus credit under purchase accounting, because of asset
value decline, might be insufficient to permit the carryover of earned surplus.
Hence, it would seem that a more direct approach to the earned surplus carryover is
necessary. See in this connection PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-704F (1959).
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become owners of the continuing corporation. 31 When a combination
is designated a purchase, it is recorded in the same manner as a combin-
ation transaction under the old act.43 If, however, the combination is
designated a pooling of interests, it is recorded in the same manner as
a combination transaction may now be recorded under the New Act's
second option.433 The decision whether a combination is to be treated
as a purchase depends, not upon the designation of the transaction
according to its legal form, but rather upon the existence of continuity
of ownership interests, business and management, and upon the relative
dominance of any of the constituent corporations. No one of these
factors is to be determinative, and the decision is to be made in view of
all attendant circumstances. 434
The New Act's provisions were added to the Model Act source
provision in 1962 in an attempt to accommodate the Model Act to
accountants' procedures under Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48.
The draftsmen could find "no compelling reason of public policy or
business necessity for not providing that in all transactions of merger
or consolidation or acquisition of assets, or even in a mere acquisition
of control, the earned surplus of both participating corporations may
properly be considered as earned surplus, rather than capital surplus,
of the resulting enterprise." '436 They recognized that their statute went
' AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 48, 111 14 (1957).
" Id. at ff 8.
"=Id. at 1 9. The bulletin does permit adjustments where the acquired corpora-
tion's assets are not recorded in accord with generally accepted accounting principles
or where necessary to convert its assets to a uniform accounting basis. Ibid.
Id. at f11 2, 5-7.
" See Gibson, Surphs, So What?, 17 Bus. LAW. 476, 480-83 (1962).
The Model Act prior to the 1962 amendment had provided that in the event of a
merger or consolidation, the net surplus of the merging or consolidating corporations
which was available for payment of dividends immediately prior to the merger or
consolidation, to the extent not transferred to stated capital or capital surplus,
would continue to be available for dividends. See Model Act § 69(g) appearing in
2 MODEL Acr ANN. This provision was criticized for its general lack of adherence
to the accounting pooling concept, see Baker, Dividends of Combited Corporations:
Some Problems With Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48, 72 HARv. L. REV. 494,
500-01 (1959) ; Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corpora-
tion; Act, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1377 (1957), and imprecision in its terms. See letter
addressed to the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Association,
quoted in HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 797-99 (1966). The act was amended in
reaction to these criticisms. See Gibson, supra at 481.
Of the Model Act jurisdiction, see part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. 207, 208 n.4, only
Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-102(k) (1966), South Dakota, S.D. S-ss. Laws
1965, ch. 22, § 19, Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-2(i) (1964), and Wisconsin,
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.02(11) (1957), have adopted substantially the Model Act
amendment. South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-1522 (1962), has adopted a pro-
vision achieving the effect of the Pennsylvania statute. See note 430 supra.
" See Gibson, supra note 428, at 482, stating that this was the judgment of the
Committee on Corporate Laws.
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beyond the accountants' practices, but felt that "room for further
learning by accountants should be left."M7 The obvious question raised
by the new provisions relates to their wisdom.
Initially, it should be recognized that the treatment to be afforded
a combination transaction affects not only the amount of current sur-
plus and its characterization, but also the amount of future earned
surplus via the effect of the asset values upon future expense charges. 31
It may then be asked why corporations acquiring going businesses for
cash or debentures are denied the carryover treatment. The answer
suggested by Accounting Research Bulletin No. 48 is that the share-
holders of the acquired corporation have not maintained a sufficient
interest in the acquiring corporation to warrant a carryover of attri-
butes. However, the New Act's only requirement for a carryover of
asset values and earned surplus is that shares be used in connection
with a corporate combination. It apparently is immaterial that the
shares do not vote, or are redeemable at an early date, that they repre-
sent a minuscule portion of the continuing corporation, or that the
acquired corporation's business may be sold the day after the acquisi-
tion and the proceeds invested in a new enterprise. Yet in some of
these cases, as in most of the excluded transactions involving debt,
allowance of the carryover privilege would result in a windfall increase
of earned surplus to the acquiring corporation's shareholders. Hence,
it would seem that the New Act's provisions should be narrowed to
focus upon combination transactions with sufficient continuity of inter-
est for the shareholders of the acquired corporation.4 39
Ibid.
"3 For example, assume that corporation A acquires all the assets of corporation
B, subject to B's liabilities, for 100,000 shares of $1 par value common stock whose
market value is $10 per share. Assume that B's net book value is $500,000 and that
B has $200,000 in its earned surplus account If the combination is recorded as a
pooling-of-interests, A records the net assets acquired at $500,000, and credits capital
stock $100,000, capital surplus $200,000 and earned surplus $200,000. Maximum
charges against A's revenues from B's assets would amount to only $500,000 over the
life of the assets. If the combination is recorded as a purchase, A would record the
net assets acquired at $1,000,000, would credit capital stock $100,000, and would
credit capital surplus $900,000. Maximum charges against A's revenues from B's
assets would now amount to $1,000,000, which serve to reduce future earnings below
the amounts possible under a pooling-of-interests approach. Of course, to the extent
that capital surplus is available for distribution, it may be said that purchase
accounting may provide greater immediate dividend paying capacity than does
pooling-of-interests accounting.
'* There is some evidence that the accountants may tighten their continuity of
interest requirements. See, e.g., the report of Robert C. Holsen appearing in WYArr,
A Critical Study of Accounting for Business Combbtations, AccouxITR RESEAI C
STUDy No. 5, at 111-14 (1963), wherein the author discusses the continuity require-
ment in connection with combinations involving cash and common shares, common
and preferred shares, preferred shares alone, and treasury shares of the acquiring
corporation. A fair similarity exists between Holsen's view of the continuity re-
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It may be useful in deciding what degree of continuity should be
required to consider the draftsmen's comment that the changes in the
Model Act source provision were supported by the significance of
earned surplus to the investment community.44 But how significant is
a carryover of past earnings to the investment community? The prime
consideration of most advisers concerned with financial statements has
been the estimated trend of future earnings, 441 and here the second
aspect of pooling-of-interests, the carryover of asset values, is crucial.
One of the reasons that managements have so readily accepted the
pooling-of-interests approach is that in most cases the carryover of the
acquired corporation's asset values will produce higher future earnings
than if the assets are restated in terms of current values.442 It would
seem, however, that far more accurate projections of the rate of future
earnings returns could be made if the acquired corporation's assets
were restated in terms of current value.44 3 This argument suggests that
purchase accounting should be followed in every case where the com-
bination transaction involves independent parties and that pooling-of-
interest accounting should be used only where the combination involves
corporations previously under common control.444
quirement and that required for qualification of the transaction as a reorganization
under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Compare the continuity discussion in
Sapienza, Tax Considerations In Corporate Reorganizations and Mergers, 60 Nw. U.L.
REv. 765, 780-82 (1966). While this similarity may seem to offer support for Holsen's
view regarding poolings, it should be remembered that the purpose of the tax rules,
determining whether the transactions should be the subject of tax, is quite different
from the accounting purpose, presenting the transaction in the most meaningful way.
It may be argued that if all that is required is a narrowing of the continuity rules,
the New Act provisions are appropriate since management or the accountants need
not utilize the full statutory grant. The difficulty with this position, however, is that
a broad statute encourages a broad view of poolings. More importantly, if there
are reasonable grounds for a narrower legal view of poolings, there seems to be no
reason why the statute should not attempt to state guidelines rather than leaving it
to the accountants' discretion.
See Gibson, Surplus, So What?, 17 Bus. LAw. 476, 482 (1962).
"'See, e.g., GRAHAM, DODD, & CoTMTE, SEcURITY ANALYsIs 551-62 (4th ed. 1962).
"'Kripke, A Good Look at Goodwill in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 BANKING
L.J. 1028, 1037 (1961) ; WYATr, op. cit. supra note 439, at 58.
" See May, Business Combinations: An Alternate View, J. Accountancy, April
1957, p. 33, 35. It may be argued that the same logic requires the acquiring corpora-
tion's assets be restated in terms of current values. See Hawirz, BusiNass
PLANNING 786 (1966). This portion of the argument involves us generally in the
controversy over price level adjustments in connection with dividend capacity
determinations. See text discussion beginning infra at 493.
.'.This is basically the position of WYATT, op. cit. sup4ra note 439, at 105-06.
It should be noted that the project advisory committee of the Accounting Principles
Board reviewing Professor Wyatt's study felt that it was "not realistic" and that a
distinction between purchases and poolings should be made on the existence of an
exchange of equity shares. See id. at xii-xiii. Precisely what is wrong with the
Wyatt suggestion from an accounting standpoint is not made clear apart from the
fact that "the study seems to favor a discontinuance of almost all poolings of
interests." Id. at xiii.
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Basically similar results will obtain from an analysis of the degree
of continuity to be required. The central notion of a pooling of inter-
ests is that no change of any substance has occurred by combining the
assets, businesses, management, and ownership interests of the con-
stituent corporations.449 It would seem that relatively few combina-
tions occur in which the changes in each of these criteria are not
substantial.446 For example, even where two corporations of approxi-
mately equal size and value combine in such a way that each share-
holder's interst is preserved, the combined enterprise is twice as
large and may have entirely different profit potential, product line,
and management problems than either of the constituent corporations.
Applying the pooling-of-interests notion, admittedly with some rigor,
will produce similar results to those suggested in the analysis above of
the investment community interest.44T
This analysis suggests that the approach of the old act was more
appropriate than that proposed in the New Act. However, two prob-
lems with purchase accounting should be dealt with if the old statute
is to be truly effective. The first concerns the ticklish problem of
dealing with a possible excess of the value of the acquiring corpora-
tion's stock over the value of the acquired corporation's tangible and
intangible assets-in short, the item of purchased goodwill. Under
generally accepted accounting principles, goodwill should be amortized
if it appears to have a limited life;448 but accounting practice appears
to go even further, expunging goodwill by periodic charges to income
even though there is no reason to assume limited life.449 Although
" See AICPA RESEARCH BuLL. No. 48, fflt 5-7 (1957) ; WYATT, op. cit. supra note
439, at 72.
"'HEawrrz, BUSINESS PLANNING 782 (1966), presents as a pooling situation a
combination of two real estate corporations each owning one building, where the
buildings have equal value and each corporation's shareholders get one-half of the
stock. Although this is a strong case for pooling, suppose one corporation's assets
have a very low book value and that the corporations' earned surpluses vary signifi-
cantly. It would then seem that what should be undertaken is what Wyatt refers to as
a "fair value pooling," i.e., both buildings should be recorded at current fair market
values and the corporation, as a new entity, should have no earned surplus. See
WYATT, op. cit. supra note 439, at 81-86.
" WYATT, op. cit. supra note 439, at 61 notes an increasing liberality in the
interpretation placed by accountants upon the pooling-of-interests criteria. See
also id. at 27; Sapienza, Distinguishing Between Purchase and Pooflng. Ill J.
Accountancy, June 1961, p. 35, 40, where the author states that relative size and
continuity of management are not helpful in distinguishing between purchase and
pooling but that avoidance of goodwill may be a major factor in the decision.
' See AICPA REsEARcH BULL. No. 43, ch. 5, " 6-7 (1953). Where the corpora-
tion is uncertain whether the goodwill will have a life as long as the enterprise,
it may amortize it by systematic charges to income despite the absence of present
indications of limited existence or loss of value. Id. at 1 7.
' See Kripke, supra note 442, at 1033 and n.12.
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there is no reason to quarrel with the amortization procedure, it may
well be asked whether the initial existence of the goodwill has been
demonstrated simply because of the excess of share value over the
acquired corporation's current asset values. Kripke has argued con-
vincingly"' that the appropriate "cost" of the acquired corporation
is the greater of the current value of its assets or the acquiring corpora-
tion's book value per share rather than the market value of the ac-
quiring corporation's shares. Since acceptance of this suggestion would
eliminate at least part of the management's objections to purchase
accounting451 and result in more useful cost data,42 it should be con-
sidered as a possible change in the old procedure.
A second problem with the purchase-accounting technique is that it
may influence the manner in which a combination is effected by making
it expedient that the corporation with the smallest asset appreciation
be the acquired corporation. It seems clear that accountants and the
courts should ignore the formal manner of acquisition in favor of
realistically determining which is the acquiring corporation.45 3
'" Kripke, supra note 442, at 1036-37 contends:
When goodwill is created by a purchase of a company in the present climate of
business acquisitions, there will seldom, if ever, be proof of the state of
affairs contemplated by the advocates of amortization through income charges;
namely, that the goodwill has a foreseeable limited life, or that it represents
excess earning power for a definable temporary period. On the contrary, the price
level out of which goodwill is created in current acquisitions seems to depend
on reciprocal factors: (1) (a) optimistic expectations of rising, not falling,
levels of earnings, and (b) recent use of higher multiples for capitalization of
known and foreseeable earnings; and (2) a readiness to pay high prices based
on the knowledge that the acquiring corporation's stock being issued in payment
is a medium of exchange inflated by the same factors which inflate the value of
the acquired company. If this analysis is correct, the arguments for amortizing
the goodwill through the income account are without substance. The point is
a fundamental one. The objection is not merely that it becomes necessary to pick
a partially arbitrary method of amortization, for this is equally true of depre-
ciation and other important charges. Rather, the point is that the amortiza-
tion does not have any place in the income account, for there is no solid ground
for treating the supposed exhaustion of goodwill as a cost of producing the
revenues for the years in question.
Some accounting support for Kripke's position has already appeared. See report
of Robert C. Holsen appearing in WYATT, A Critical Study of Accounting For
Busihess Combinatioms, AccouNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 5, at 113-14 (1963).
See also WYATT, op. cit. supra note 439, at 91 where the author urges diminished
emphasis upon the fair market value of shares in determining the cost of the
acquired corporation's assets.
' See Kripke, supra note 442, at 1033-39; Sapienza, supra note 447; WYATr,
op. cit. supra note 439, at 62-64.d"See quotation from Kripke, supra note 450.
imAmple legal precedent for such action should be provided by Farris v. Glen
Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 143 A.2d 25 (1958).
Two other problems with the purchase accounting solution should be mentioned.
First, purchase accounting will in many situations produce results different from
those dictated by the Internal Revenue Code, where the acquired corporation's basis
is generally carried over to the acquiring corporation. See INT. REv. CODE OF
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(5) Declaration of Dividends Out Of Surplus Arising From un-
realized Appreciation. The old act expressly prohibited payment of
cash or property dividends from unrealized appreciation relating to
fixed assets 4 54 and cash dividends generally from the unaccrued portion
of any unrealized profit on other assets.4 " The New Act contains no
provision specifically dealing with unrealized appreciation; hence the
issue must be resolved by construing the various definitions in the act
in light of the purposes of dividend regulations.
George C. Seward, a member of the American Bar Association Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws responsible for drafting the source provi-
sions of the Model Act, takes the position that earned surplus includes
unrealized appreciation.456 He argues that the term "net assets" refers
1954, § 362(b). The extent of difficulty this problem engenders depends upon the
general correlation between accounting data and tax data-probably not very high in
any event-and the answer to the second problem, the effect of a legal prohibition of
poolings of interest for dividend capacity determinations upon the use of the
pooling of interest technique as an accounting device. While it is generally
assumed that statutory requirements for purchase accounting make poolings im-
possible, see e.g., Gibson, supra note 440, at 481, it is not clear that poolings could
not be used for accounting statement purposes, barring the presence of a statutory
provision keying accounting statements to the statutory requirements. Such con-
clusion, however, would mean that another set of books would be required to compute
income and earned surplus for dividend purposes and that shareholders' reports would
have to detail discrepancies between earnings per share and earnings per share
eligible for dividends. Conceivably, if the potential confusion from dual reporting
is great enough, the statute could be deemed controlling and poolings prohibited.
However, because permitting accounting use of poolings would reduce the lack of
correlation between accounting and tax data, it would seem that a court should be
reluctant to find that the confusion was in fact great enough.
"a WAsH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250 (4) (a) (1958).
" See WASH. Rm. CODE §23.01.250(5)(a)-(d) (1958). WASH. REv. CoDE §
23.01.250(5) (c) (1958) qualifies the text statement by permitting notes, bonds, or
obligations for the payment of money purchased or acquired at a discount to be
taken at their actual market value if they are readily marketable. Greenough &
Ayer, Funds Available for Corporate Dividends in Washington. 9 WASH. L. REv.
123, 135-36 (1934), term the exception in subsection 5(c) "indefensible" on the
ground that there is little reason to separate notes or bonds from other types of assets
for purposes of paying dividends from unrealized appreciation. Conceivably a court
might avoid this problem by narrowly interpreting "acquired at a discount" to refer
only to what is referred in the Internal Revenue Code as "original issue discount
bonds." See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1232.
It is unclear why the statute permits property dividends to be paid out of
surplus arising from unrealized appreciation on current assets unless the provision
is intended to permit recognition of unrealized appreciation on a particular asset
where that asset is to be distributed to the shareholders. See in this respect BAKER
& CARY, CASES ON CoRoRArTioNs 1208-09 (3d unabr. ed. 1958). If this was the intent
of the draftsmen, it is quite clear that the statute went much too far since under its
broad language appreciation in inventory will support a dividend paid with the
corporation's receivables.
See Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the Model Business
Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 440-43 (1952).
Ray Garrett, another member of the Committee, agrees with Seward's conclusion
but feels that earned surplus arising from unrealized appreciation should be available
only for share dividends. See Garrett, Capital and Surphs Under the New Corpora-
tion Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 259 (1958).
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to current values and that as a result the only issue is whether appre-
ciation in asset value gives rise to earned, rather than capital, sur-
plus.4 7 He urges that unrealized appreciation gives rise to earned
surplus because: (1) accountants charge unrealized depreciation,
when recognized, to earned surplus, and thus, consistency demands
that unrealized appreciation accrue to the same source; (2) earned
surplus is defined in the Model (and New) Act to include gains, which
term ordinarily connotes appreciation in value; (3) unrealized ap-
preciation, if credited to capital surplus, would cause peculiar account-
ing results upon the sale of the asset, since the gain realized on an
unwritten-up asset would be earned surplus whereas a portion of the
gain on a written-up asset might well be locked into capital surplus by
the Model (and New) Act's rules relating to such surplus; and finally
(4) the Illinois Business Corporation Act, source for most of the
Model Act's provisions, specifically prohibited dividends from unreal-
ized appreciation, but this provision was omitted in drafting the Model
Act sectionsi 8
It has been previously asserted that, contrary to the approach im-
plied in Seward's arguments, the appropriate means for solving prob-
lems of interpreting accounting terms in the New (Model) Act is for
the court to look first to the result suggested by generally accepted
accounting principles and to accept that result if it is consonant with
the basic policies underlying dividend regulation.4 9 Although there
may have been room for doubt as to the accountants' position at the
'" Seward, supra note 456, at 440. Gibson, the present vice-chairman of the
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, also takes the position that the current value of
assets is to be used in determining the amount by which net assets exceed stated
capital and hence in determining overall surplus. See Gibson, Surplus, So What?,
17 Bus. LAW. 476, 487 (1962).
-Id. at 440-43.
'" See text accompanying note 364 supra.
Seward's strongest arguments relate to interpreting the accounting terms to permit
recognition of unrealized appreciation as an element of surplus, and more particu-
larly, earned surplus. His argument that consistency demands unrealized apprecia-
tion be recognized as earned surplus disregards the possibility that accountant's
practices, as described by Seward, may be more consistent with a higher level ob-
jective (e.g., creditor protection) than consistency in the account to be effected by
the recording of unrealized appreciation or depreciation. The problem with treat-
ment of sales if the asset was written-up perhaps can be solved by writing it down
to cost immediately prior to its sale. If this maneuver is not appropriate under the
New Act restrictions on transfers to and from capital surplus, then those rules should
be changed-at least in the event that it is concluded that sound policy prohibits
treatment of unrealized appreciation as earned surplus. With respect to the Illinois
statute, it should be noted that that statute uses an impairment of capital test for
dividend fund determination. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.41(a) (1963). The New
Act test involves the accountants' definition of earned surplus which may have been
interpreted to exclude unrealized appreciation as a source by its very terms. The
basic Illinois test is not quite as capable of this construction.
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time Seward wrote,46° the Accounting Principles Board of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants recently opined that "prop-
erty, plant and equipment should not be written up by an entity to
reflect appraisal, market or current values which are above cost to the
entity."46' The Board also approved an earlier Institute rule to the
effect that "unrealized profit should not be credited to income account
of the corporation either directly or indirectly,"" 2 which has been
generally interpreted as applying to appreciation on goods held for
sale in the ordinary course of business.6 3 Under the test described
"The controversy concerned the possibility of unrealized appreciation relating
to fixed assets appearing in the accounts, for the Institute's position with respect to
recognition of unrealized appreciation on current items has been relatively constant
since 1934. See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, p. 11 (1961), stating the rule
quoted at text accompanying note 462 infra. On the subject of unrealized appreciation
of fixed assets, the Institute had taken the position in 1940 that "appreciation
[of fixed assets] normally should not be reflected in the books of account of corpora-
tions." AICPA RESEARCH BULL.. No. 5, ff 2 (1940). This admonition against reflecting
unrealized appreciation was removed when Research Bull. No. 5 became a part of
Research Bull. No. 43. Research Bull. No. 43 stated only that "historically, fixed assets
have been accounted for on the basis of cost. However, fixed assets in the past have
occasionally been written up to appraised values because of rapid rises in price levels."
AICPA REsnacicH BULL. No. 43, ch. 9B. 1f 1 (1961).
"'STATUS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETINS, OPINIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BOARD, OPINION No. 6 f 17 (1965, effective as of December 31, 1965).
As to the current status of the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board, see
discussion in text accompanying note 569 infra.
The SEC, as a matter of policy, disapproves the writing-up of assets over their
cost. See RAI'PAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3-9 (2d ed. 1963).
Two blue-sky administrations have specific rules against recording unrealized
appreciation. Bulletin No. 47, Tenn. Dep't of Ins. & Banking, BLUE SKY L. REP.
ff 45,613; Okla. Sec. Comm'n Rule 63-12, BLUE SKY L. REP'. ff 39,635.
112 See generally ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
BULLETINS, OPINION No. 6, at 1 11 (1965) (effective as of December 31, 1965),
which does not disapprove of the rule appearing in AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43,
p. 11 (1961).
" The rule goes on to recognize an exception for inventories in industries in
which there is a trade custom, due to the impossibility of determining costs, to
take inventories at net selling price, which may exceed cost. See generally AICPA
RESEARCH BULL. No. 43 ch. 4, statement 9, ir 16 (1953). Thus, it seems reasonable
that the rule was intended to be concerned with unrealized appreciation on inventory
and not on fixed assets. See 2 HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 247 (temp. ed. 1964).
Three accounting research studies, prepared for the Accounting Principles Board
as vehicles for discussion and analysis prior to the issuance of pronouncements by
that Board, present differing views toward unrealized appreciation. MooNiTz &
SPROUSE, A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Entcr-
prises, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, at 55 (1962), takes the position that
general changes in the price level should be recognized in the accounts, with correspond-
ing adjustments in invested capital and that changes in the value of particular assets in
excess of the general changes in the price level should be reflected in the income for the
period. On April 13, 1962, the Accounting Principles Board stated that it felt that the
approach taken in Accounting Research Study No. 3 was "too radically different from
present generally accepted accounting principles for acceptance at this time." STAFF OF
THE AcCOUNTING RESEARCH DivisION, Reporting the Financial Effects of Price-Lovel
Changes, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6, at xi-xii (1963), on the other hand, took
the view that effect of price-level changes should be disclosed as a supplement to state-
ments prepared by conventional accounting methods and that changes in reproduction
cost could be ignored as not affecting a corporation's overall income. In the price-level
suppplementary data, all elements of the financial statements would be restated by
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above, the remaining issue is whether this result is consonant with
basic dividend policy.
Although the courts have reached mixed results on the question,8 4
means of a single index of the general price-level as of the balance sheet date so that
all financial data will be expressed in terms of dollars of the same purchasing power.
The study distinguishes the effects of a changing price-level upon non-monetary
items from such effects upon monetary items. It concludes that the effects of a
changing price-level upon monetary items give rise to a gain or loss that should be
recognized in the corporation's financial statements. The final statement of relevance
appears in GRADY, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, ACCOUNTING
RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, at 214 (1964) : "The amount of any revaluation credits should
be separately classified in the stockholders' equity section, and it is not available for any
type of charge except on reversal of the revaluation."
'y The cases are collected in BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1177-1208(3d unabr. ed. 1958) and in HEnwz, BUSINESS PLANNING 328-35 (1966).
The leading authority on the question is Randall v. Bailey, 288 N.Y. 280, 43
N.E.2d 43 (1942). In that case, the corporation had written up certain realty from abook value of $1,500,000 to its assessed value of $8,700,000 and declared dividends from
the resulting appreciation. The corporation's trustee in bankruptcy brought an action
to hold the directors liable for such dividends under the New York dividend statute
which at that time provided:
No stock corporation shall declare or pay any dividends which shall impair
its capital or capital stock, nor while its capital or capital stock is impaired,
nor shall any such corporation declare or pay any dividend or make any distri-
bution of assets to any of its stockholders, whether upon a reduction of the
number of its shares or of its capital or capital stock, unless the value of its
assets remaining after the payment of such dividend, or after such distribution
of assets, as the case may be, shall be at least equal to the aggregate amount of
its debts and liabilities including capital or capital stock as the case may be.
The trial court held for the defendants because it felt that the last major clause of the
statute (beginning "unless the value of its assets") could not grammatically be
construed to modify the first limitations on dividend payments. It then rejected
plaintiff's argument that only realized gains could be taken into account for dividend
purposes, stating that an earlier amendment to the New York statute removing the
words "surplus profits" from the statute indicated an effort to abolish any require-
ment of realization. The court said the test was "whether or not the value of the
assets exceeds the debts and the liabilities to the stockholders," and that for this
purpose "all assets must be taken at their actual book value." The court of appeals
affirmed, basing its decision primarily upon a construction of the statute that placed
the "unless" clause as a qualification upon the earlier dividend limitations. As
HERWvTz, BUSINESS PLANNING, 328-32 (1966), notes, a number of questions may be
raised about both opinions in the case. For example, the trial court's construction of
the New York dividend statute not to permit the reading of the "unless" clause back
into the earlier dividend limitations scarcely seems consistent with its later con-
clusion that the earlier dividend limitation should be interpreted to encompass a
value of assets test; the latter conclusion would in essence mean that the legislature
had stated the same test in two different ways. Moreover, there are policy reasons
for distinguishing between the second series of clauses in the statute relating to
reductions of capital from the earlier clauses relating to ordinary dividends. See
text discussion infra part III under the heading "Reductions of Capital." Regarding
the court of appeals opinion, the court never really answered the trial court's gram-
matical construction problems. Moreover, merely reading the "unless" clause into thefirst series of dividend limitations does not afford a positive grant to pay dividends
from unrealized appreciation but merely represents a second hurdle which must be
cleared in connection with any dividend payment. And, of course, there is the failure
of both courts, in construing a statute quite obviously involving accounting termin-
ology, to pay attention to accounting practices as to the possibility of payment of
dividends from unrealized appreciation.
The most recent cases considering the issue where the statute was not explicit
have involved repurchases of shares. See Mountain State Steel Foundries Inc. v.
Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960), and Baxter v. Lancer Indus., Inc., 213 F.
Supp. 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), both of which permitted use of current values.
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the commentators generally have taken the position that unrealized
appreciation should not be available as a dividend source."' The
various arguments on dividends from unrealized appreciation can best
be evaluated if the increase in current value over cost, labelled un-
realized appreciation, is divided into two components: the portion
attributable to increases in the market prices for individual assets and
the portion attributable to decreases in the value of money.46 Divi-
dends from the unrealized appreciation due to increases in market
prices of individual assets have been decried for lack of objective
standards by which the appreciation can be measured and, hence,
lack of controls upon unscrupulous managements. 67 A more telling
complaint, however, is that the use of such unrealized appreciation
for dividends presupposes more immediate cash conversion possibilities
for the assets concerned than the assets possess in the ordinary course
of business.46 The arguments against dividends from unrealized ap-
preciation arising from price-level increases, to the extent such ap-
preciation has been separately recognized, generally center on the
"See, e.g., BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 574 (1946); KEEL, CORPORATE DIVIDENDS
100 (1941) ; LATTIN, CORPORATOrNS 478 (1959) ; Folk, Revisiting the North Carolina
Corporation Law: The Robinson Treatise Reviewed and the Statute Reconsidered,
43 N.C.L. REv. 768, 840 (1965).
'"'See BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CoRPORArIONS 1206 n. 1 (3d unabr. ed. 1958);
Comment, Significance of Appreciation and Changing Price Levels in Corporate
Dividend Policies, 35 MicE. L. REV. 286 (1936).
" See, e.g., BALLANTINE, COmORATIONS 574 (1946) ; cf. Broad, The Applicability
of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 104 J. Accountancy, Sept. 1957, p. 31.
To some extent this problem can be surmounted through the use of "specific" (as
opposed to general) price indexes that have begun to be developed for various types
of equipment and construction. As more of these indexes are developed, and they
become more reliable, objections to dividends from such unrealized appreciation will
center on the second argument raised in text immediately following.4
"See, e.g., LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1935);
BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CoRPoATIo Ns 1195 (3d unabr. ed. 1958) ; Baker, Hildebrand
on Texas Corporations-A Review, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 169, 187 (1942) ; Gibson, Sur-
plus, So What? 17 Bus. LAw 476, 487 passimn (1962).
The argument has frequently been stated in terms of lack of realization. See, e.g.,
Berks Broadcasting Co. v. Craumer, 356 Pa. 620, 52 A.2d 561, 574 (1947) : "The reason
why a purely conjectural increase in valuations cannot be considered for the purpose
of dividends is because such re-appraisals, however apparently justified and accurate
for the time being, are subject to market fluctuations, are merely anticipatory of
future profit, and may never be actually realized as an asset of the company." The
court defined realize as "convert to actual money." So defined, the argument assumes
too much for it would preclude application of principles of accrual accounting. The
true issue would seem to be as stated in text, although one may prefer a "realization"
rule for its ease in administration.
If the issue is the relative proximity in the operating cycle of the assets converted
to cash, it may be argued that appreciation relating to inventory should be allowed as
a dividend source. To some extent, such appreciation may be already being recog-
nized by corporations following the first-in-first-out method of inventory costing.
See Hackney, The Financial Provisions of The Model Business Corporation Act,
70 HARv. L. Rxv. 1257, 1380 n. 110 (1957). But cf. AICPA RESEARCH BULL. 43, at
11 (1961). Other ramifications of this problem are explored at text accompanying
notes 558-77 infra.
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notion that a shareholders' investment, in terms of its original pur-
chasing power ,should be maintained in the corporation. 69 Addition-
ally, it may be argued that recognition of price-level increases as a
dividend source would be inconsistent with national price-level control
policies since the increased dividends possible from such sources would
add to inflationary tendencies already inherent in a rising price-level. 7 0
The proponents of dividends from unrealized appreciation offer rel-
atively little in support of their position. Seward, despite his argu-
ments in support of treating unrealized appreciation as earned surplus,
concedes that "such dividends, as a general rule, are not good prac-
tice."' 1  He implies,472 as others have suggested,473 that unrealized
appreciation should be a valid dividend source only as a protective
measurement against director liability. It would seem, however, that
if directors' potential liability for improper dividends is too severe, a
more direct solution would be to reexamine the liability rules rather
than needlessly broaden the scope of the permissible dividend fund.
In view of the lack of policy arguments supporting dividend pay-
ments from unrealized appreciation, and the possible ambiguity re-
garding validity of dividends from that source under the New Act,
the act should be amended to exclude such appreciation clearly from
earned surplus. 74 Unrealized appreciation, if recognized, would then
be capital surplus, and thus subject to the controls over its distribu-
tion previously discussed.470
" See Comment, Significance of Appreciation and Changing Price Levels h;
Corporate Dividend Policies, 35 Micn. L. REv. 286, 291-95 (1936) ; BAKER & CARY,
CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1195 (3d unabr. ed. 1958).
For a more thorough discussion of price-level adjustments and the protection of
the purchasing power of stated capital originally contributed, see text accompanying
notes 493-513 infra.
'"oComment, Significance of Appreciation and Changing Price Levels in Cor-
porate Dividend Policies, 35 MIcH. L. Rnv. 286, 296 (1936).
,n Seward, supra note 456, at 441.
". See Seward, smpra note 456, at 443 where he states: "even though conservative
accounting and business policy, in the absence of extremely unusual circumstances,
recommend against such procedure, a board of directors acting under the Model Act
would have the power to augment earned surplus by recognizing appreciation in the
value of assets."
'7' See HERWITz, BUSINESS PLANNING 324 (1966), where the author suggests that
the decision in Randall v. Bailey may have been influenced by the strictness of
directors' liability standard under New York law.
,. For an example of one state adopting the Model Act which has undertaken
this step, see Carrington, Experience in Texas With The Model Business Corpora-
tion Act, 5 UTAH L. Rnv. 292, 296-97 (1957).
'"' One additional step that might be taken would be to limit by statute the situa-
tions in which unrealized appreciation could be recognized. See, e.g., N.C. GEar.
STAT. § 5549(e) (1965), requiring that the surplus arise from a "revaluation of assets
made in good faith upon demonstrably adequate bases of revaluation."
As to the relation between recognition of unrealized appreciation as capital sur-




(6) Declaration of Dividends When the Corporation Has Suffered
Unrealized Diminution in the Value of its Assets."' While no court
has answered the precise question under the old act,477 the commen-
tators state478 that its requirement that allowance be made for "losses
of every character"4 79 probably means that unrealized diminution in
the value of assets must be taken into account in determining the
amount of surplus available for dividends. Under the New Act, earned
surplus takes into account a corporation's "losses" since incorpora-
tion.8 Seward argues that "diminution in value is a 'loss' even though
not realized by a sale," partly because of his assertion that net assets
are determined by current values, and partly because he feels that the
statement quoted represents the accountants' position.481 According to
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43, however, the treatment afforded
unrealized diminution in value depends on the particular type of asset.
Inventory is to be written down when the goods' disposal in the
ordinary course of business will produce less than cost, regardless of
' This section is not concerned with the problem of the effect of watered assets
upon a corporation's dividend paying capacity, which is considered at text accom-
panying note 543 infra.
' Only a limited number of cases have considered the effect of unrealized dim-
inution in value upon a corporation's dividend-paying capacity, of which Randall
v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. City), aff'd without opinion, 29 N.Y.S.2d
512 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d 43 (1942), and George
E. Warren Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 587 (D. Mass. 1948), are the most
prominent. In Randall, 23 N.Y.S2d at 184, the trial court held that "the same reasons
which show that unrealized appreciation must be considered are equally cogent in
showing that unrealized depreciation likewise must be considered." (For an analysis
of the Randall trial court's opinion on unrealized appreciation, see note 464 snpra.)
In George E. Warren Co. v. United States, supra, a Maine statute permitting
dividends from profits was construed to require a holding company to write down the
carrying value of its securities to their market value. The court, 76 F. Supp. at 593,
referred to the "large and permanent declines in security values" and said that "the
decline in value ... was radical and part of a permanent settling down of security
values." For other cases, see George E. Warren Co. v. United States, supra at 592;
BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1211-14 (3d unabr. ed. 1958) ; 2 BONBRIGHT,
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 924-25 (1937).
'See 1 MODEL Acr ANN. § 40(a) 1 2.02(6) (b) ; Baker, Hildebrand on Texas
Corporations-A Review, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 169, 189 (1942); Mulford, Corporate
Distributions to Shareholders and Other Amendments to the Pennsylvania Business
Corporation Law, 106 U. PA. L. Rxv. 536, 538-39 (1958). But see Greenough & Ayer,
Funds Available for Corporate Dividends in Washington, 9 WASH. L. REv. 63, 83-85
(1934), where the authors interpret the old act as requiring recognition of unrealized
diminution in value of current assets but state that "there is some doubt as to the
practice it demands in the case of an unrealized fall in the value of fixed assets."
They argue that the act should be interpreted to demand write-downs of permanent
losses but not "market fluctuations."
' WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(3) (1958).
's WASH. Rv. CODE § 23A.04.010 (12) (1965).
Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the Model Business Cor-
poration, Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 440-41 (1952). He cites as authority for his state-
ment Company Revaluation of Assets: Charging of Losses, SEC Accounting Re-
lease No. 1, April 1, 1937. That release, however, seems to have been concerned with a
write-down of obsolete fixed assets, at least in the view of the chief accountant.
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whether the diminution is due to physical deterioration, obsolescence,
changes in price levels, or other causes.482 Marketable securities rep-
resenting the investment of cash available for current operations will
be written down only where the market value is substantially less than
cost and it is evident that the decline in market value is not due to a
temporary condition. 48  Apart from their possible inclusion in quasi-
reorganization write-downs, 484 no mention is made of fixed asset write-
downs. Few accountants, however, support write-downs of fixed as-
sets in situations not involving obsolescence. 483  Nor is there much
support for write-downs of long-term investments in securities when
there is no evidence of a permanent decline in value." 6 Assuming that
only the write-downs permissible under these rules are encompassed
"AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 4, statement 5 and 11 8 (1953). This is a
restatement of the rule of pricing inventories at cost or market, whichever is lower.
Market is defined as a current replacement cost except that market should not be less
than net realizable value (estimated selling price in the ordinary course of business
less costs of completion and disposal) reduced by an allowance for a normal profit
margin, nor should it exceed net realizable value. Id. at statement 6 & ff 9.
' =AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 3, 11 9 (1953).
Accounts receivable under the bulletin are to be carried at "net of allowances for
uncollectible accounts." Ibid. Thus, if expected cash realizable value (as distin-
guished from what the receivables would bring on a sale to a third party) is within
the value spectrum sought, receivables would also be written down on a fall of such
realizable value.
.' See AICPA RESnAICH BULL. No. 43, ch. 7 (1953), and text discussion infra
part III under the heading of "Reduction of Capital."
'GRADY, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accountmg Principles for Business
Enterprises, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, at 253 (1965), states only that
"there are situations in which cost is no longer meaningful. By carrying plant at
cost, less accumulated depreciation, there is a representation that the remaining bal-
ance of the investment is properly chargeable to future operations and has a fair
chance to be recovered. If this assumption appears no longer valid with respect to
material items, it may be prudent to recognize the loss by reducing the book value
to the estimated remaining useful cost to the enterprise." Whether this statement
goes beyond obsolescence and includes write-downs for price-level or replacement cost
changes is not clear. Most accountants, however, sanction write-downs for ob-
solescence with fairly liberal standards as to when an asset is obsolescent. See, e.g.,
ALEXANDER, INCOME MEASUREMENT IN A DYNAMIC EcoNoMY 55 (1950) ; WIxoN, Ac-
COUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 18:39 (4th ed. 1964); Mauriello, Depreciation, Depletion,
and Fixed Asset Valuation, in 1 ACCOUNTANTS' ENcYcLOPEDIA 193 (1965). But see
FINNEY & MILLm, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING--INTERMEDIATE 308 (6th ed. 1965),
stating that some accountants postpone recognizing an obsolescence loss until the
loss is recognizable for tax purposes. Although some accountants do favor recogni-
tion of declines in the replacement costs of fixed assets, see, e.g., SPROUSE & MOONITZ,
A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting Principles for Business Enterprises, ACCOUNT-
ING RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, at 55 (1962), the vast majority of accountants are cur-
rently against such practice. See, e.g., FiNNEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra at 341;
GRANT & NORTON, DEPRECIATION 387 (rev. printing 1955) ; MEIGS, JOHNSON & KELLER,
INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 443 (1963). Few accountants countenance write-downs
merely for price level declines. See, e.g., KERRENBROCK & SIMONS, INTERMEDIATE
ACCOUNTING, COMPREHENSIVE VOL. 480 (2nd ed. 1953).
As to the difference between obsolescence and a decline in reproduction costs, see
Paton, Measuring Profits Under Inflation Conditions: A Serious Problem for Account-
ants in ZEFs & KELLER, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING THEORY 369-70 (1964).
" See GRADY, op. cit. supra note 485, at 260.
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within the accountants' definition of a "loss,"'48 7 the issue remains
whether that definition is appropriate as a matter of dividend policy.
Again it is helpful to separate changes in value into changes resulting
from a general increase in the value of money (or fall in the general
level of prices) and those resulting from changes in the replacement
costs of individual assets. There seems to be little reason why price-level
declines should result in a contraction of a corporation's dividend pay-
ing capacity, apart from the possibility that the corporation may incur
a loss in repaying debts with more valuable dollars that may not be
offset by the increase in value of its own cash holdings."" Indeed,
reduction of dividend capacity because of price-level declines would
seem contrary to national policy since it might prevent payment of
dividends at a time when distribution of the funds would help ameli-
orate the factors causing the price-level fall.4 °9 From the standpoint
of dividend policy, the need to recognize declines in the replacement
cost of individual assets would seem to depend upon the likelihood that
replacement costs will increase49 before the assets are realized in the
ordinary course of business and the corporation's competitive disad-
vantages because of the decline in replacement costs.4 9 1 While the
accountants' rules are generally in accord with these policies, there is
'S Under the principles espoused by MooNITz & SPROUSE, op. cit. supra note 485,
declines in the replacement cost of a corporation's assets, beyond those attributable
to declines in the general level of prices, would result in a current loss from holding
the assets. But the effects of the price level decline itself would merely be a re-
statement of capital. See id. at 170. If the views presented in Accounting Research
Study No. 6 were adopted, a general decline in the price level would result in
recognition of gains or losses on monetary items but not on other assets. See
AccouNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6, op. cit. supra note 463, at xii.
'. See BAKER & CARY, CASES ON" CORPORATIONS 1212 (3rd unabr. ed. 1958); and
the proposal of AcCOUNTING REsEARcH STUDY No. 6, at xii (1963), discussed supra
note 463. See also Latty, Uncertainties in Permissive Sources of Dividends Undcr
Present G.S. 55-116, 34 N.C.L. REv. 261, 277 (1956).
See BAKER & CARY op. cit. supra note 488.
' This seems to be the problem underlying statements by courts and accountants
concerning the permanence of the decline. It may well be asked why such "losses"
must be recognized for dividend purposes before the period in which they are
actually "realized." Cf. ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6, op. cit. supra note
488, at 7, suggesting that a corporation's overall profit position will be unchanged
by replacement cost recognition. The answer, of course, is that current recognition
of the losses and consequent prevention of dividends to that extent helps protect
stated capital which otherwise might be invaded if dividends were currently
declared and the loss taken into account in the later period.
... A new competitor to the corporation would have the advantage of purchasing
its equipment at the lower prices, BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1211
(3d unabr. ed. 1958), see MAY, FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 100-101 (1943), and if its
threat were severe enough, sound dividend policy would appear to require an earnings
freeze to the extent necessary to remove the disadvantage. Baker, Hildebrande on
Texas Corporations-A Review, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 169, 192-93 (1942), suggests as
a second example a situation where the corporation for some ulterior reason had
paid a price higher than replacement costs for the particular assets.
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enough deviation between their rules, particularly concerning price-
level changes, and the policies to demand that courts carefully consider
situations involving unrealized diminution for appropriate dividend
effects rather than simply following current accounting practices.4 92
(7) Effect of Rising Price Level on Computation of Fund Available
for Dividends.493 Neither act provides a clear answer to the question
whether a corporation in determining its dividend capacity must take
into account the effect of a rising price level upon the relevant financial
information. 494 Generally accepted accounting principles, despite pro-
longed and frequent pleas to the contrary,495 do not currently require
price level adjustments.0 6 Instead, corporations are given the option
'A troublesome factor in the background of any situation involving unrealized
diminution is the relative freedom that corporations have in reducing their capital,
and hence, in absorbing declinations in value. See Baker, Hildebrand on Texas
Corporations-A Review, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 169, 194 (1942); Comment, Writing
Doz n Fixed Assets and Stated Capital, 44 YALE L.J. 1025 (1935). See also Fitts,
The Relation of Depreciation to the Determination of Surplts and Earnings
Available for Dividends, 33 VA. L. REv. 581, 600 (1947). Thus, any decision here
must be made in full view of the policy considerations presented regarding such
reductions. See text discussion infra part III under the heading "Reductions of
Capital."
'" This section does not deal with problems of rising replacement costs. That
problem, often confused with the topic of this section, is discussed at text accom-
panying note 563 infra.
.' Under the old act, the question would turn on whether the language requiring
"proper allowance for depreciation . . . sustained, and losses of every character" de-
manded such adjustments. See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(3) (1958). The question
under the New Act involves construction of the language "net profits, income, gains and
losses." See WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(12) (1965).
" See, e.g., SwEENEv, STAmLIZED ACCOUNTING xi (1936) ("The truthfulness of
accounting depends largely upon the truthfulness of the dollar-and the dollar is a
liarl"); MONTGOmERY, AUDITING iV (7th ed. 1949) (same sentiment); PATON &
PATON, CORuoRATIOY ACCOUNTS AND STATEMENTS 527 (1955) (same sentiment).
On April 28, 1961, the Accounting Principles Board agreed that the assumption
in accounting that fluctuations in the value of the dollar may be ignored was
"unrealistic," and instructed that a research project be set up to study the problem.
See quotation from the minutes of the Accounting Principles Board in the project
so set up, STAFF OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH DrvisioN, Reporting The Financial
Effects of Price-Level Changes, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6, at 1 (1965).
Accounting Research Study No. 6 concluded that financial reporting should reflect
the effects of inflation and deflation by restating all elements of the financial
statements in supplementary statements by means of a single index of the general
price level. See also SPROUSE & MOONITZ, A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting
Principles for Business Enterprises, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, at 17-18,
55 (1962), favoring correction for price level changes but not specifying whether
changes are to be made in conventional accounts.
For a history of the problem, see Zeff, Episodes in the Progression of Price-
Level Accounting in the United States, The Accountants' Magazine, April 1964,
pp. 285-304.
'" See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 9A (1953) (the Institute "believes
that accounting and financial reporting for general use will best serve their purposes
by adhering to the generally accepted concept of depreciation on cost, at least until
the dollar is stabilized at some level."); id. at ch. 4, statement 3 ("the primary basis
of accounting for inventories is cost .... "). The SEC is in accord with these




of using the last-in-first-out assumption as to the flow of inventory
costs (and hence matching more closely current costs with revenue) ,"
making annual appropriations of net income or surplus in contempla-
tion of replacement of fixed assets at higher prices, 498 or using the
declining-balance method of computing depreciation. 49  The obvious
question raised is whether the purposes of dividend regulation require
a result different from the current management-option approach sug-
gested by generally accepted accounting principles.
The dividend policy issues can be best evaluated in full view of what
can be done by current price-level adjustment procedures, as exem-
plified by those described in Accounting Research Study No. 6.111
That study recommends that all elements of a corporation's conven-
tional financial statements be restated in supplementary statements by
means of the gross national product implicit price deflator index as of
the balance sheet date so that all the financial data will be expressed in
terms of dollars of the same purchasing powerY01 It also recommends
that gains or losses resulting from the effect of a changing price level
upon a corporation's monetary items-principally cash and contracts
to receive and pay money-be specifically recognized as an element of
' AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 4, statement 4 (1953).
4- Id. at ch. 9A, ff 6.
Under Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43 if unrealized appreciation has been
recorded on the corporation's books, depreciation must be based on the written-up
cost. See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 9B (1953), as endorsed by ACCOUNT-
ING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH BULLETIN, OPINION No. 6
f1 17 (1965). This raises questions under both acts as to whether the revaluation
surplus can be transferred to earned surplus as it is realized through the depredation
process. Although AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 5 1 14 (1940), clearly stated that
such realized surplus upon transfer became appropriated earned surplus unavailable
for dividends, AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 9B is silent on the matter.
Seward, as previously noted, feels that no authority under the Model Act exists for
such a transfer if the appreciation is capital surplus. Seward, Earned Surplus-Its
Meaning and Use in The Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 443
(1952). See also DODD & BAKE, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1035 n.33 (2d ed. 1951),
where the authors express doubt about the practice where senior securities have been
issued, or traded in, in reliance upon financial statements reflecting the write-up.
In view of Seward's doubt on the matter, the New Act probably should be amended
to provide for transfers of capital surplus arising from unrealized appreciation to
earned surplus upon realization by sale of the asset or by depreciation charges.
See in this respect PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 704B (1958).
AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 44 (Revised 1957).
STAFF OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH DVSION, REPORTING THE FINANCIAL EFFECTS
OF PBicE-LEvEL CHANGES (1965).
"Id. at xi. For a lengthy discussion of the problem of selecting an index
number for making such adjustments, see id. at 61-117.
For a reasonably detailed example as to how the adjustments would be made,
see id. at 121-33. For other examples, see JONES, PRICE LEVEL CHANGES AND
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS-CASE STUDIES OF FOUR COMPANIES 12 passim (1955);
KENNEDY & MCMULLEN, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS-FORM, CONTENT AND INTERPRE-
TATION 340-71 (1957); MASON, PRIcE-LEvEL CHANGES AND FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
-BASIC CONCEPTS AND METHODS 14-22 (1956).
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net income 02 Apart from this rather complex adjustment,a" the only
other major problem in adjusting the elements of the corporation's
income statement into year-end dollars involves depreciation. °4 To
compute depreciation, the assets must be "aged," the appropriate
index applied so as to convert the costs into current year-end dollars,
and depreciation computed upon the current costs. The most impor-
tant balance sheet adjustments restate the corporation's inventory,
plant and equipment and common shareholders' equity in year-end
dollars. As the study notes, such price-level adjusted data would
permit directors and courts to determine whether a particular dividend
would deplete the real stated capital originally contributed by the
shareholders.r°
"Id. at xii. Under the study's proposal, the purchasing-power gain or loss on
monetary assets and liabilities appears only on the supplementary, rather than
conventional, financial statements. Id. at 126.
Possibly because of the unrealized appreciation present therein, see example in note
503 infra, a controversy exists as to whether monetary gains and losses ought to be an
item of income as against presentation as part of an analysis of changes in the share-
holders' equity. See id. at 13, 149-65. The study recommended income statement
treatment, arguing that monetary gains and losses have occurred in the same sense that
interest has accrued, or that bond discount has accumulated or been amortized. See
id. at 43. It seems clear that the price level may change before the monetary asset is
collected or utilized, or before a monetary liability is discharged, particularly where
the gain or loss concerns preferred shares or long term debt. Hence, dividend policy
previously discussed in connection with unrealized appreciation would seem to require
that unrealized net monetary gains not be recognized as enlarging a corporation's
dividend capacity. Unrealized net monetary losses appear to be fundamentally a form
of contingency reserve and should be treated as such for dividend purposes by
directors.
"See generally ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6, op. cit. supra note 495,
at 126-28. To compute the gain or loss on monetary items, changes in the corpora-
tion's cash and contracts to receive and pay money during the year must be
analyzed to determine the price-level at the time the changes occur. Once these
data are available, the various transactions are converted into year-end dollars and
the resultant effect upon the net monetary items balance is computed. The adjusted
net monetary items balance is then compared with the balance wvithout adjustment,
to determine the net gain or loss. That gain or loss, if realized through repayment,
must in later years be reconverted into year-end dollars as of the end of the later year.
The possibilities for unrealized gains in these computations can be demonstrated
by an example. Assume that a corporation borrows, when the price level is 150,
$200,000 on a long-term loan. Assume that at the end of the first year the price
level is 180 and that no principal payments have been made on the loan. At the end
of the first year, the corporation would have a purchasing-power gain of $40,000
[($200,000 x 180/150)-$200,000] despite the fact that the transaction is in no
sense closed.
" For other adjustment problems, see id. at 38-42.
"5 Under the study's procedure, substantial portions of the increases in the asset items
resulting from conversion to year-end dollars in a period of rising price-level would
be reflected in the adjusted stated capital account, paid-in surplus (if any), and retained
earnings. See id. at xii. Such increases are, of course, unrealized and hence subject
to the objectives previously noted in connection with the payment of dividends from
unrealized appreciation. See text accompanying note 454 supra. The presence of such
unrealized appreciation in such accounts, particularly earned surplus, would mean
that a corporation's dividend capacity could not be determined simply by examining
the corporation's current price-level adjusted balance sheet and earned surplus state-
ments. Earned surplus available for dividends could be determined only by accumu-
1966]
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The fact that the courts in the past have ignored the problem per-
haps ' " suggests that current dividend regulation policy requires only
that the dollar amount of stated capital, rather than purchasing power
equivalent to the amount originally contributed, is all that need be
maintained in the corporation.507  If this is the current policy, it is
submitted that that policy should be reexamined, particularly in view
of the relative ease with which stated capital may be distributed.
Much has been made in the past of stated capital as a "cushion" for
senior shareholders and long-term creditors."'5 Yet the cushion doc-
trine is made virtually illusory by the failure to take into account
declines in the purchasing power of the dollars concerned."' Even in
a corporation with a single class of stock and no long term debt, the
shareholders' expectation that only profits will be freely distributable
is scarcely being satisfied when the dividend policy makes no require-
ment that profits be determined after deducting an adequate provision
for asset consumption. 10
lating the income as shown as the corporation's income statements adjusted to year-nd
dollars of the particular year covered by the statement (and as adjusted to year-end
dollars of the current year).
One item statements adjusted for price-level changes would make clear is the
transfer of real capital from preferred shareholders and long-term bondholders to
common shareholders in the event of rising prices. See, e.g., Jones, The Effect of
Inflation an Capital and Profits: 7he Record of Nine Steel Companies, 87 J.
Accountancy, Jan. 1949, p. 9, 26. These groups could protect themselves by insisting
by contract that their liquidation preferences be protected with dollars possessing
purchasing power equivalent to their original contributions. But at the moment it
does not appear that the law has gone so far as to protect their capital absent such
a contractual provision. See Dean, supra note 509.
See, e.g., DEAN, BUSINESS INCOME UNDER PRESENT PRICE LEVELS 86 (1949);
JONES, EFFECTS OF PRICE LEVEL CHANGES ON BUSINESS INCOME, CAPITAL, AND TAXES
141 (1956); Spear, Dividend Policies Under Changing Price Levels, 27 HARV. Bus.
REV. 612 (1949).
1 Cf. Hackney, The Financial Provisions of the Model Business Corporation
Act, 70 HAv. L. REV. 1357, 1383 (1957).
' See, e.g., part I, 41 WASH. L. REv. 207, 235-38.
' See Comment, Significance of Appreciation and Changing Price Levels in
Corporate Dividend Policies, 35 MIcH. L. Rxv. 286, 296 (1936) ("the failure of
modern accounting to take account of appreciation in the monetary value of corporate
assets causes part of the economic wealth which the stockholders originally invested
in the business to be diverted into the income account. If this diversion of capital
into corporate income is not detected, and the income is unthinkingly paid out
entirely in dividends, the result is inevitably an impairment of corporate capital.").
But see Dean, Provision for Capital Exhaustion Under Changing Price Levels,
65 HARV. L. REv. 1339, 1341-43 (1952), who argues that as long as the obligation to
creditors (and presumably preferred shareholders) is measured in terms of nominal
dollars without any adjustment for changes in the value of the dollar, depreciation
may be based on cost. The fact that creditors and senior shareholders may have
their investment returned in dollars with less purchasing power does not alter
their expectation that the corporation by its activities will not increase their risk
of loss by diminishing their margin of safety by declaring unwarranted dividends
in periods of rising prices.
" See generally REPORT OF GROUP ON BUSINESS INCOME, CHANGING CONCEPTS
OF BUSINESS INCOME 99 (1952) ; Kiley, Some Legal Problems Arising From Profit
Determination in Periods of Rising Prices, 24 U. CINc. L. REv. 519, 527-33 (1955).
[ VOL. 42 : 119
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
This is not to say that implementation of a dividend policy revolving
about maintenance of capital in purchasing power equivalent to the
dollars originally contributed would not be a difficult matter. Indeed,
the accountants' hesitancy toward changing their principles seems
more due to difficulties in finding an objective, verifiable technique by
which such adjustments could be made, than to disagreement with the
basic objective."' But there seems to be little reason why considera-
tion of a requirement that the financial data interpreted in making
dividend decisions be stated in dollars of constant purchasing power
should not now begin. 12 Such an adjustment may cause some initial
difficulty in interpretation by management and courts; 3 but once the
initial difficulties are surmounted, dividend policy would rest on a much
sounder footing.
(8) Determination of the Dividend Fund For A Corporation Own-
ing Stock in Subsidiary Corporations. The legal issues involved in
determining a parent corporation's dividend capacity can be best un-
derstood in the context of the various accounting procedures that may
be used in reporting parent-subsidiary operations. Two radically dif-
ferent procedures are available to account for the parent corporation's
investments in subsidiaries: the legal-basis method and the economic-
basis method. 14 Under the legal-basis method, the parent and its
"' See quotation from minutes of Accounting Principles Board, op. cit. supra
note 495; Hackney, supra note 507, at 1382 (1957).
XA statutory requirement that the financial data be adjusted for changing
price-levels would be premature as accountants and management have not yet had
sufficient experience with the techniques. But perhaps the statute could encourage
efforts in this direction if it recognized as a permissible term in preferred shares,
see in this connection WASH. Rm. CODE § 23A.08.120 ff 2 (1965), a clause designed
to protect the shares' liquidation preference against changes in the price level.
"' Illustrative of the type of difficulties that may arise is the problem of the
effect of technological change upon the validity of the price-level index. Accounting
Research Study No. 6 concludes that the problem can be only partially overcome by
present statistical techniques and that as a result an index series should not be used
for projections too far in the past. It recommends a cut-off date of 1945 for applica-
tion of the index; thus all units acquired prior to 1945 will be valued as if acquired
in that year.
Another problem that may arise is that a number of corporations may have paid
out dividends illegally in the past, relying in good faith on incorrect data. See,
e.g., Jones, The Effect of Inflation on Capital and Profits: 77e Record of Nine
Steel Companies, 87 J. Accountancy, Jan. 1949 p. 9, 13, reporting that the nine
companies involved paid $409 million in dividends from capital during 1941-47,
in contrast to the reported net incomes after dividends of $543 million. DEAN,
BUSINESS INCOME UNDER PRESENT PRicE LEvELs 86 (1949), suggests that because of
the novelty of the problem and the lack of crystallization of thought on proper
procedures, the courts would not hold directors liable for past failures to take into
account price-level increases. The problem no longer can be considered novel but
absent some reasonably clear statutory authorization, it seems unlikely that a court
even today would impose liability in the circumstances. See also problem discussed in
note 505 supra.
" The terminology used above is suggested by FiNNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES
OF ACCOUNTINC-INTERz DATE 269 (6th ed. 1965). Others label the procedures the
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subsidiary are treated as separate entities with the result that the
subsidiary's earnings have no effect upon the parent's financial state-
ments until the subsidiary pays dividends.5 15 In contrast, under the
economic-basis method, the parent records increases and decreases in
the investment account to reflect changes in the subsidiary's net assets
because of income, losses, and dividends.516 The offsetting entries to
the changes in the parent company's investment account are made to
the parent's income accounts.51 As between these two procedures, the
cost and accrual methods, see, e.g., 2 MooNITZ & JORDAN, AccouNTixG 235 (rev. ed.
1964), or the cost and adjusted-book-value bases, see, e.g., Hackney, Financial
Accounting for Parents and Subsidiaries-A New Approach to Consolidated State-
meits, 25 U. Pri-. L. Ray. 9, 18-19 (1963). It seems best to avoid terminology calling
the legal-basis a "cost" method since the carrying value of the investment in the
subsidiary in a pooling-of-interests does not coincide with the ordinary notions of
cost. See Hackney, supra at 16-17, suggesting that the appropriate carrying value in
such circumstances is net book value of the underlying assets rather than current
fair value of the stock issued.
" See, e.g., BAKER & CAR y, CASES ON CoRoRATIONS 1339-40 (3d unabr. ed.
1958) ; FINNEY & MILLER, op. cit supra note 514 at 269-71. Under this method, post-
acquisition losses by the subsidiary would not be recorded on the parent's books
unless the losses are substantial and indicative of a permanent decline in value and
earning power of the subsidiary. See text discussion accompanying note 486 supra;
Hackney, supra note 514, at 19.
The recognition afforded to a cash or property dividend by the subsidiary to the
parent corporation depends on whether it has post-acquisition earnings and, if it
does not, whether it was acquired in a purchase or a pooling. If the subsidiary has
post-acquisition earnings, its dividends would be income to the parent and augment
the parent's earned surplus. See, e.g., FINNEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 514, at
270. If the subsidiary has no post-acquisition earnings, and it was acquired in a
purchase, the parent would reduce its investment account by the amount of the
dividend. See AICPA RESEARcH BULL. No. 43, ch. 1, 1 3 (1953). Where the sub-
sidiary has no post-acquisition earnings but the acquisition was a pooling-of-interests,
the accountants offer no answer. See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 48, Iff 10 & 2(1959). It would seem, however, that since the pooling-of-interests concept envisions
accounting for the enterprise as if the subsidiary had been in its role since organization,
a dividend from any earned surplus of the subsidiary should be income to the parent.
See Hackney, supra note 514, at 22. But see BAKER & CARY, op. cit. supra at 1337-38.
Accountants appear to be willing to use a LIFO system for determining whether
a dividend is from post-or-pre-acquisition earnings. See FINN Y & MILLER, PpaN-
cIPLEs OF AcCOUNTIN,--ADvANcED 356-57 (5th ed. 1960); sources cited in BAKER
& CARY, op. cit. supra at 1334 n.5.
m6See, e.g., FINNEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 514, at 271-72; 2 MooNrrz &
JORDAN, AccouNTING 235-37 (rev. ed. 1964).
Although the accounting authorities are not particularly clear on the point, it
would seem that if the subsidiary is acquired in a pooling-of-interests transaction,
the parent corporation can in connection with the recording of the investment on the
economic-basis method add to its earned surplus the subsidiary's earned surplus to
date of acquisition (adjusted for amounts capitalized by the parent). Cf. Salmonsen,
Reporting Earnings After an Acquisition, 117 J. Accountancy, March 1964, p. 51.1 See AICPA REsEARcHr BULL. No. 51, 19 (1959) (so stating with respect to
economic-basis reporting of unconsolidated subsidiaries in consolidated reports);
AccoUNTING PRINCIPLES BOARD, STATUS OF ACCOUNTING RESEAR H BULLETINS
OPimox No. 6, at 16 (1965), stating that paragraph 19 of Research Bull. No. 51
describes the equity (economic-basis) method and that paragraph 6 of chapter 7B
of Research Bull. No. 43 (stating that a shareholder's increase in his equity through
undistributed earnings does not give rise to income by the shareholder) should not
be construed as prohibiting the equity method of accounting for substantial inter-
corporate investments. See also 2 MooNriTz & JORDAN, ACCOUNTING 235 (rev. ed.
1964).
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legal-basis method seems to be the generally accepted method of re-
porting a parent's investment in its subsidiaries on a continuing
basis.""
In addition to these techniques, accountants employ as an aid to
shareholders and creditors of the parent company statements consoli-
dating the operations and financial position of the parent and its sub-
sidiaries as if the group were a single company. 19 These consolidated
statements are generally designed to eliminate the effects of intergroup
transactions, obligations and proprietorship investments.20 One ob-
vious, and important, effect of the procedure for dividend purposes is
that consolidated earned surplus would include at least post-acquisition
earnings of the subsidiaries.5 2' Consolidation presupposes ownership of
at least a majority voting interest 22 and that the resulting statements
will "make the financial presentation which is most meaningful in the
circumstances." 23
E.g., FINNEY & MILLER, op. cit. supra note 514, at 272; WIxoN, ACCOUNTANTS'
HANDBOOK 23.13 (4th ed. 1956). But see RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 7.9 (2d ed. 1963) ("it is becoming more and more customary to carry the
investments in subsidiaries at the amount of the parent's equity in the subsidiaries,
with the increase in equity being reflected in the parent company's income state-
ment.') AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 51, 1f 19 (1959), may be thought to be
contrary to the text statement, but the bulletin refers to treatment of investments in
consolidated statements where one would expect to find equity reporting. It is
unclear whether the opinion of the Accounting Principles Board endorsing the
description of the economic-basis method was meant to endorse the preference for
methods also stated in paragraph 19 of AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 51 (1959).
"'See generally AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 51 (1959); FINNEY & MILLER,
PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING-ADVANCED, chs. 17-26 (5th ed. 1960); 2 MOoNlTz &
JORDAN, ACCOUNTING, AN ANLYSIS OF ITS PROBLEmS chs. 8-10 (rev. ed. 1963);
WIxoN, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK § 23 (4th ed. 1964).
'See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 51, 111 6-7 (1959) ; BAKER & CARY, CASES ON
CoRPoRATIoNS 1342 & n29 (3d unabr. ed. 1958).
' If the subsidiary had been acquired in a purchase, consolidated earned surplus
would include only post-acquisition earnings of the subsidiaries. See AICPA RE-
SEARCH BULL. No. 51 1 9 (1959); Hackney, Financial Accounting For Parents aid
Subsidiaries-A New Approach to Consolidated Statements, 25 U. Prr. L. REV. 9,
22 (1963). But if the subsidiary was acquired in a pooling-of-interests transaction,
all of the subsidiary's earned surplus should appear in the consolidated earned surplus.
See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 48, 111 0, 9 (1957).
1 AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 51, ff 2 (1959), states that the usual condition for a
controlling financial interest is ownership by one company, directly or indirectly, of
over fifty per cent of the outstanding voting shares of another company. Exceptions to
this rule are recognized where control is likely to be temporary, where control does
not rest in the majority owners or where the minority interest in the subsidiary is
so large in relation to the equity of the shareholders of the parent in the consolidated
net assets that consolidated statements would not be meaningful. See also the discus-
sion in WixoN, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 23.3 (4th ed. 1964). The SEC rules gen-
erally prohibit consolidating any subsidiary which is not majority owned by the
parent. See SEC Reg. S-X, art. 4, rule 4-02(a), 17 C. F. R. § 210.3-.17 (1964). But
see in this connection SEC Securities Act Releases Nos. 4657, 4657A (Dec. 6 and 7,
1963) ; Rappaport, Consolidation of Sattelite Companies: 77te Atlantic Research Case,
34 N.Y.C.P.A. 131 (1964), concerning the possibility that effective control, rather than
record control, may demand consolidation.
L"AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 51, 11 3 (1959). The Bulletin advises separate
statements where the subsidiary is a bank or an insurance company or where the sub-
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Both acts appear to prohibit the use of consolidated statements in
connection with determining the parent's dividend capacity through
limiting reference terms, viz., "its" or "the corporation. '5 24 With re-
spect to the treatment of the investment account in the parent's finan-
cial statements for dividend purposes, either act, interpreted under
generally accepted accounting principles, would seem to mean that the
legal-basis of reporting would be required. 2' But the inquiry remains
whether this result is consistent with dividend regulation policy.
The commentators generally report that use of consolidated state-
ments, or their effective equivalent for dividend purposes---economic-
basis reporting of subsidiary investments 2 6-is not favored for deter-
mining the dividend capacity of the parent corporation. 27 The reason
generally advanced for such disfavor is the similarity of recognizing
sidiary is a finance company and the parent is engaged in manufacturing operations.
Ibid. The SEC's position is similar. See RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE 15.3-15.4 (2d ed. 1963).
" See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.250(4) (a) (1958) ("no corporation shall pay div-
idends, in cash or property except from the surplus of the aggregate of its assets over
the aggregate of its liabilities, including in the latter amount of its capital stock
.... ") ; WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(12) (1965) (" 'earned surplus' means the por-
tion of the surplus of a corporation equal to the balance of its net profits ... from the
date of incorporation .... ") ; WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.420(1) (1965) ("dividends
may be declared and paid in cash or property only out of the unreserved and unre-
stricted earned surplus of the corporation....") (Emphasis added.) "Corporation" is
defined under both acts so as to be incapable of expansion to a consolidated group.
See WASH. REv. CODE § 23.01.010(1) (1958); WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.04.010(1)
(1965). Compare in this respect CAL. CoRP. CODE §§ 118, 3009, defining a "holding
corporation" and permitting such corporation to include in its required annual report
to shareholders either a consolidated balance sheet or the parent's separate balance
sheet. Despite the lack of limited reference terms in the relevant statutes and the
existence of these provisions, however, 1 BALLANTINE & STERLING, CALIFORNIA COr-
PORATION LAWS 261 (4th ed. 1965), indicate that consolidated statements cannot be
used for dividend purposes in California.
"Apparently Seward's view would permit subsidiaries' earnings to augment the
parent's earned surplus. See Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meaning and Use in the
Model Business Corporation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 440 (1952).
" The economic-basis method is keyed, as in essence are consolidation procedures,
to the parent's interest in the subsidiary's surplus. Moreover, accountants apparently
make the same set of adjustments for intercompany gains and losses under the eco-
nomic-basis method that are made under the consolidation procedures. See AICPA
RESEARCH BULL. No. 51, ff 20 (1959). Hence, the parent's surplus under the economic-
basis method should approximate the consolidated surplus.
"See BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 548 (rev. ed. 1946) ; HILLS, THE LAW OF Ac-
COUNTING & FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 38 (1957); KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING
202 (1954) ; LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 489 (1959); de Capriles, Modern Financial Ac-
cournting, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 45 (1963).
The closest case in point is Cintas v. American Car & Foundry Co., 131 N.J. Eq.
419, 25 A.2d 418 (Ch. 1942), aff"d on opinion below, 132 N.J. Eq. 460, 28 A.2d 531
(ch. 1942), which involved the computation of the amount of an annual dividend
credit to non-cumulative preferred under the New Jersey rule. The court rejected
defendant's contention that enterprise accounting should be used stating that the
corporate identity would be disregarded only in order to prevent fraud, deception,
evasion or injustice. For comment on the case see Berle, The Theory of Enterprise
Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343, 355 (1947) ; May, The Americal Car and Foundry
Decision, 74 J. ACCOUNTANCY 517 (1942) ; Comment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 132 (1942).
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subsidiary profits as part of the parent's dividend-capacity to recog-
nizing unrealized appreciation as a dividend source. 28 However, the
principal objections to using unrealized appreciation-the lack of ob-
jective means of determination and the cash conversion probability
characteristics-do not seem applicable to the parent's recognition of
the subsidiary's earnings. -9 Since the subsidiary presumably has de-
termined its earnings in accord with generally accepted accounting
principles, its earnings should be as objective as the parent's own
earnings. And while the parent probably does not anticipate selling the
subsidiary's stock, the subsidiary has realized the profits concerned in
ordinary operations and they could possibly be declared to the parent
as a dividend, if necessary.53 °
The ultimate issue involved would seem to be how much significance
is to be accorded the fact that the subsidiary is nominally a separate
legal entity.531 There seems to be fairly general agreement that con-
solidated statements afford both creditors and shareholders of the
parent company a more meaningful financial picture of the enter-
prise's operations. 32 Yet the law balks at using the same data for
dividend purposes, apparently because the parent's creditors can reach
the subsidiary's assets only after the subsidiary's creditors have been
satisfied.133 But this means that subsidiary operations are disadvan-
taged in comparison with operation of the activity as a division of the
parent, since transfer of the funds from the subsidiary to the parent-
by hypothesis not needed by the parent for the dividend-may be
subject to federal income taxes.r 34 Even if federal income taxes are
'See KATZ, INTRODUCTION TO ACCOUNTING 202 (1954) ; KEHL, CORPORATE Divi-
DENDS 145-46 (1941); LArrIN, CORPRATIOrS 489 (1959).
" See text accompanying notes 467-75 supra, discussing these aspects of ordinary
unrealized appreciation.
" See Hackney, Financial Accounting for Parents and Subsidiaries-A New Ap-
proach to Consolidated Statements, 25 U. PITT. L. REv. 9, 26-28 (1963) ; KATZ. INTRO-
DUCTION To ACCOUNTING 202 (1954) ; LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 489 (1959) ; de Capriles,
Modern Financial Accounting, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1, 46 (1963).
" See, e.g., de Capriles, Modern Financial Accounting, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1, 43-45(1963). In this respect it is interesting to note that the accountants' preference for
the legal-basis method of reporting subsidiary investments is said to be the result of
"the restrictions inherent in the legal concept of separate corporate entities." See
FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING--INTER=EDIATE 272 (6th ed. 1965).
" See, e.g., GUTHMANN, ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 548-50 (4th ed.
1953) ; RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 15.3 (2d ed. 1963).
See de Capriles, Modern Financial Acconting, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 1, 45 (1963).
If the parent and the subsidiary file consolidated federal income tax returns, the
dividends by the subsidiary will not be subject to tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-3(b)(2) (i) (1966). In order to be eligible to file consolidated returns, the parent must
own, directly or indirectly, at least 80% of all voting stock and all other classes of
stock outstanding. See INT. Rxv. CODE OF 1954, § 1504(a). If, however, consolidated
returns are not, or cannot be, filed, the subsidiary's dividends will be free from tax
only if the parent owns sufficient stock in the subsidiary to qualify for consolidated
19661
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not an issue, however, the necessity of a dividend declaration by the
subsidiary to the parent to support the parent's dividend can hardly
be explained as a matter of parent-creditor protection when the parent
may be called upon to reinvest the funds immediately in the sub-
sidiary.535  If the parent has preferred shares outstanding, their in-
terests are generally best protected by permitting the subsidiary's
earnings to be used as a dividend source by the parent. 3 And since
the dividends paid from such surplus can not be said to have been
paid from the common shareholders' contributed capital, they would
appear to have no particular interest militating against using the sub-
sidiary's earnings as a dividend source for the parent.5 37  Hence, it
would seem that dividend regulation policy, on balance, would favor
use of consolidated data in determining the size of the parent's divi-
dend fund.538
reporting, the parent elects to forego certain tax advantages, and the dividends come
from qualifying earnings and profits of the subsidiary. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 243(b). If the parent cannot qualify under either provision, it is entitled to an
eighty-five per cent dividend credit. INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, § 243(a) (1). Hence, the
distributions might be subject to a tax as high as 7.2% under current rates.
Federal income taxes have been cited as the main reason for statutory amendments
permitting parent dividend declaration without subsidiary dividend payment. See
Mulford, Report of the Corporation Law Committee, 34 PA. B.A.Q. 418, 421 (1963)
(relating to the Pennsylvania provision discussion at text accompanying note 540
infra); Bullard, Corporate Accounting and the Law, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 32, 47 (is-
cussing a change of the sort enacted in the North Carolina statute discussed at text
accompanying note 539 infra).
It has been argued that unless the subsidiary's earnings are paid up to the par-
ent, it may have losses which will destroy its potentiality for such distributions and
the parent would then be left with a payment out of capital. But as Hackney, supra
note 530, at 28, points out, any dividend is declared on the basis of information cur-
rently on hand. A parent could declare a dividend from its own earned surplus and
the following year suffer catastrophic obsolescence losses. If these losses were not
foreseeable, however, the dividends would have been proper.
1 If the subsidiary's earnings are available for dividends by the parent only after
the subsidiary declares a dividend, the parent's earnings can be controlled by the ma-
jority common shareholders to the disadvantage of the preferred shareholders. See
Note, 56 HAav. L. R.V. 132 (1942), dealing with Cintas v. American Car & Foundry
Co., 131 N.J.Eq. 419, 25 A.2d 418 (ch. 1942), discussed in note 527 supra.
I Hackney, supra note 530, at 28 goes even further by arguing in support of the
Pennsylvania statute discussed at text accompanying note 540 infra, that the modern
conception is that capital and capital surplus are not so much for the protection of
creditors as for the support and protection of shareholders and that the shareholders
should thus be able freely to forego the cushion if they desire. It does not seem neces-
sary to go this far to support the amendment. On the modern role of legal capital, see
part III infra at "Reduction of Capital."
I'But see Oirlo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.32(a), 1721.32(E), 1701.33 (1964) which
prohibit the subsidiary's earnings as a source for the parent's dividends.
If the legal-basis reporting method is adhered to, a question that must be answered
is whether gains and losses on intergroup transactions must be taken into account in
determining the parent's earned surplus. BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS
1343-44 (3d unabr. ed. 1958), indicate that gain has not thus far been vitiated by ab-
sence of arms-length dealing. It would seem that intercompany transactions must be
carefully scrutinized in connection with determining the parent's earned surplus be-
cause of the ease with which profit can be shifted back and forth from parent to sub-
sidiary.
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A number of different methods are available by which this policy
could be effectuated. It is possible that the courts could reach the
desired results simply through interpretation of the language of either
act since neither prohibits use of economic-basis reporting. However,
since the issue is subject to doubt and a long adverse history, it would
seem wiser to amend the statute to state the result clearly. At least
three statutory approaches to the subject are available. The first,
following the recent North Carolina statute, would permit a parent
corporation to treat share dividends received from the subsidiary as
earned income to the extent of the amount of the subsidiary's earned
surplus capitalized in connection therewith5 39 A second, following the
recent amendment to the Pennsylvania statute, would endorse eco-
nomic-basis reporting of subsidiary investments, treat increases in
such investment accounts due to subsidiary earnings as capital surplus,
and permit dividends from such capital surplus when the parent has no
earned surplus and when the distribution is appropriately labelled. 4
A third would permit parent corporations to determine the relevant
financial data on the basis of either the parent-only statement or a
consolidated statement.541 Of these approaches, the Pennsylvania
statute seems slightly better than the others because it avoids direct
use of consolidated data (and hence confusion regarding the entity
I N. C. Gm. STAT. § 55-49(1) (1965). See also Bullard, Corporate Accounting
and The Law, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 32, 50, suggesting such an approach.
" PA. STAT. AN N. tit. 15, § 2852-702(A) (4) (Supp. 1965) provides:
Dividends may be declared and paid in cash or property out of unrestricted capital
surplus of the corporation to the extent of the net aggregate undistributed, unre-
stricted and unreserved consolidated earned surplus of such corporation and its
majority-owned subsidiaries organized under the laws of a state territory or pos-
session of the United States of America if at the time of any such dividend such
corporation has or as a result of such dividend will have no earned surplus. In
computing such consolidated earned surplus, the financial statements of the corpora-
tion and its majority-owned subsidiaries shall be consolidated after eliminating
all inter-company items, and there shall be deducted an amount equal to the aggre-
gate of all dividends theretofore paid pursuant to this subsection (4). Each such
dividend when made shall be identified as a payment out of capital surplus not in
excess of such consolidated earned surplus.
The Pennsylvania act provides that unrealized appreciation generally is capital sur-
plus when recorded. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-702 (Supp. 1965). For a de-
tailed discussion of section 702(A) (4), see Hackney, supra note 530, at 9-34.
A rather interesting question under the Pennsylvania statute is whether the parent
must make provision in computing the capital surplus for federal income taxes that
would have to be paid if the subsidiary does pay dividends to the parent in the future.
See on this question MoNTomERY, AuDTmNG 490-91 (7th ed. 1949).t
"This suggestion is patterned upon the California provisions discussed in note
524 supra. From the standpoint of accounting procedure, this suggestion would oper-
ate substantially as the Pennsylvania approach does since accountants presumably
would follow the economic-basis of reporting in order to support dividend declara-
tions by the parent. If this approach were to be pursued, it would seem that the stat-
ute should also require, as does Pennsylvania's, that the parent's earned surplus be
exhausted before any dividends could be paid from the subsidiary's earned surplus.
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concept), and because it avoids the requirement of a declaration of a
stock dividend by the subsidiary. 2
(9) Declaration of Dividends By A Corporation With Watered
Stock. The old act apparently prohibited declaration of dividends by a
corporation until the capital deficit created by the issuance of watered
stock had been offset by accumulated surplus.4 3 Resolution of the
question under the New Act involves a process of elimination. Upon
proof of watered assets, and assuming no change in their inherent
value, the corporation presumably must reduce net assets by the
amount of the water. 44 Under the statutory definitions in the New
Act, a reduction in net assets must be accompanied by a reduction in
either stated capital or surplus. 45 Since the act does not contemplate
a reduction of stated capital in the circumstances,1 40 the issue is
' The requirement of a declaration of a stock dividend by the subsidiary would
mean in essence that preferred shareholders would not be quite as well protected as
under the Pennsylvania rule. See note 536 sutpra. The second problem with the stock
dividend approach is that it may involve a needless divergence from generally ac-
cepted accounting principles. See AICPA RESEARCH BULL. No. 43, ch. 7B ff 6 (1953).
Moreover, the approach may not remove from the subsidiary's earned surplus gains on
intergroup transactions.
' See Commissioners' Notes in 9 U.L.A. 170 (1957), indicating that such was
the effect of Ohio Sess. Laws 1931, vol. 114, § 8623-38, at 62, upon which WASH. PnV.
CODE § 23.01.250 (1958) was modeled. No significant deviation between the Wash-
ington provisions and the Ohio statute exists regarding this point. Hence, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the text statement is the Washington rule also.
Some difficulty arises in determining what statutory language supports this con-
clusion. Greenough & Ayer, Funds Available For Corporate Dividctns in. W1'ashing-
ton, 9 -WASH. L. REv. 63, 85 (1934), seem to associate it generally with the operation
of WASH. REV. CODE § 23.01.250(3) (1958). But the same result could be obtained by
using an interpretation of asset values consistent with generally accepted accounting
principles. See text accompanying notes 550-57 infra.
"' Although the New Act does not contain a provision requiring assets to be re-
corded at their fair value as of the time of acquisition, see in this respect N. C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 55-50 (c) (2), 55-52(e) (1965), it is implicit in the New Act's watered
shares provisions that such recording is intended. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23A.08.-
150, .210 (1965) ; Hackney, Accounting Principles In Corporation Law. 30 LAW &
CONTE1P. PROB. 791, 815 (1965).
Accountants generally reject the par or stated value of stock as a reasonable basis
for originally recording assets acquired in favor of either the fair market value of the
stock given or the fair market value of the property acquired. See, e.g., BIERMAN,
FINANCIAL AND MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 218 (1963); GRADY, Inventory of Gen-
erally Accepted Accounting Principles For Business Enterprises, ACCOUNTING RE-
SEARCH STUDY No. 7, at 196 (1965); HATFIELD, SANDERS & BURTON, ACcOUNTING
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 339 (1940); MEIGS, JOHNSON & KELLER, INTERMEDIATE Ac-
COUNTING 514-15 (1963) ; MONTGOMERY, AUDITING 233 (7th ed. 1949). But see FINNEY
& MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING-INTERMEDIATE 291 (6th ed. 1965), where a
distinction is drawn between the obligation of the company accountant and the public
accountant; GILLMAN, ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS OF PROFIT 477 (1939).
" See WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.04.010(9), (10), (11) (1965) ; Garrett, Capital and
Surplus Under The New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 239, 242
(1958).
" On reduction of stated capital under the New Act, see WASH. REV. CODE §§
23A.16.010, .110, .120 (1965) ; part III infra under the heading of "Reductions of
Capital"; HERWITZ, BUSINESS PLANNING 350-58 (1966).
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whether the reduction is to affect capital surplus or earned surplus.
As Hackney suggests, however, it is probably implicit in the New Act's
provisions that the only charges permitted to capital surplus are those
specified in the act.'17 Hence, the apparent result under the New Act
is that dividends from earned surplus will be frozen until the water has
been "squeezed" out of the assets either by collection, subsequent
earnings, or a reduction of stated capital. 4"
It may well be asked whether this result represents sound dividend
policy.' 4' Accountants faced with watered assets charge the com-
See Hackney, The Financial Provisions of The Model Business Corporation
Act, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 1357, 1390 (1957). Hackney uses as support for this view the
Model Act predecessor to WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 1 2 (1965), which permits
directors by resolution to transfer earned surplus to capital surplus, stating that ap-
parently it was thought that the board might not otherwise have the power to do so.
It would seem that the view can also be supported simply by the general structure of
the New Act since it seems implicit in the various differences between dividends
from earned surplus and those from capital surplus that charges to capital surplus
must be restricted if restrictions on disposition thereof are to have any significance.
See Hackney, The Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law Amendments, 19 U. PITrT.
L. REV. 51, 72-73 (1957). And, of course, it is clear that if the earlier suggestions
regarding exhaustion of earned surplus before distributions can be made from capital
surplus are adopted, see text accompanying notes 414-15 supra, the conclusion in text
must be adopted as a necessary incident of the scheme. Cf. BAKER & CARY, CASES ON
CoRPoR ATIONS 1301 (3d unabr. ed. 1958).
A difficult question arises as to whether the statute ought to be amended to provide
specifically that charges to capital surplus other than those permitted by the Act are
prohibited. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-704(D) (1958). A concomitant
of such a provision would be a series of fairly detailed provisions as to permissible
charges, which would presumably be basically keyed to charges permitted under gen-
erally accepted accounting principles that were consistent with good dividend policy.
See for a discussion of such provisions Hackney, The Pennsylvania Business Corpor-
ation Law Antendments, 19 U. PTT. L. REv. 51, 73-74 (1957). The main difficulties
with this approach are the resulting statutory complexity and the need to seek statu-
tory complexity and the need to seek statutory amendments as accounting theory on
permissible charges to capital surplus evolves.
It would appear that the presence of some statutory ground rules on the subject
would be superior to the present statutory ambiguity. But perhaps the flexibility
problem can be avoided by including in the statutory scheme charges to capital sur-
plus considered to be consistent with sound dividend policy as determined by (for
example) the state commissioner of corporations. For more detail on this proposal,
see text infra part III under the heading "Director and Shareholder Liability."
"Of course, if one begins analysis of the question from the standpoint of whether
the capital deficit is a "loss" for purposes of New Act definition of earned surplus,
one presumably would conclude following generally accepted accounting principles
that it is not. See authorities cited in notes 550 & 551 infra. But the structure of the
Act requires implicitly that charges be tried first against stated capital and then
against capital surplus. If the charge cannot be made against either, as seems to be
the case with a capital deficit, then earned surplus must be the recipient.
There is some question as to whether a capital deficit can be removed under the
New Act by a reduction of stated capital. Under WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 ff 1
(1965), any surplus created by a reduction of capital is capital surplus. Capital sur-
plus, according to WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.16.130 3 (1965), can be used to reduce or
eliminate "any deficit arising from losses, however incurred...," after earned surplus
has been exhausted. But is a capital deficit a loss? The accountants' treatment of it
clearly indicates that it is not, see text accompanying note 550 infra, and sources there
cited, but if the deficit is chargeable under the statute to earned surplus it apparently
must be a "loss" under WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.04.010(12) (1965).
" The leading case on the question is Goodnow v. American Writing Paper Co.,
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pensating reduction to a separate account which is shown as an offset
to the capital stock outstanding account."' While treatment of the
discount account thereafter varies,"' the generally accepted view
seems to be that it should not be written off against earnings or paid-
in surplus, but rather, should be carried as a stated capital offset until
either collected or written off in connection with a reduction of stated
capital. 2 Behind this treatment lies the premise that a capital deficit
does not affect a corporation's income or retained earnings.""
In support of the New Act's conclusion, it may be argued that stock
watering is such a despicable practice that decisions on dividend ques-
tions should be shaped with a view to condemning it."4 But it is hard
to see why dividend policy should be distorted in an attempt to remedy
defects existing in the law relating to stock watering. The clear thrust
of the New Act's provisions is that dividends can freely be declared
from earnings. Freezing earnings because of stock watering would
thus exceed creditors' expectations, at the expense of all the innocent
shareholders in the corporation. And the financial benefits of an
earnings freeze can be provided to creditors and preferred share-
holders"' 5 more directly by revision of the stock watering provisions to
73 N.J. Eq. 692, 69 Atl. 1014 (1908), affirming 72 N.J. Eq. 645, 66 At. 607 (1907). The
statute there permitted dividends from surplus, or net profits arising from its busi-
ness but prohibited the dividing, withdrawing, or in any way paying to the share-
holders any part of the "capital stock." The court held that profits were an alternative
dividend source to surplus over legal capital and also held that profits were to be
ascertained by reference to the "capital stock paid in," and not to normal share capi-
tal. The court said that the prohibition against dissipating capital was "to prevent
the frittering away of the actual assets With which the company is to do business,
not the nominal assets which it has never received, and for which it still has a claim
against the subscribers of unpaid stock." Id. at 1016. For other cases both pro and
con on the Goodnow problem, see DODD & BAYER, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 994-97 (2d
ed. 1951) ; Northwestern Elec. Co. v. FPC, 321 U.S. 119 (1944).550 See, e.g., WIxoN, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 21.22 (4th ed. 1964) ; SEC Reg.
S-X, rule 3.17, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1964).
" WIxON, ACCOUNTANrS' HANDROOK 2123 (4th ed. 1964), states that despite the
accounting principle stated directly following in text above, the discount has often
been removed from the books through charges to any surplus account that has been
legally available. See also FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF AcCOUNTIN--INTERNX-
DIATE 131 (6th ed. 1965) ; HILLS, THE LAW OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL STATE-
MIENTS 88 (1957). Cf. SEC Reg. S-X, rule 3.17, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1964), indicat-
ing that discount on capital shares may at least in some circumstances be amortized.
The latter may well be limited to commissions and expenses on the share issuances.
See RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 14.19 (2d ed. 1963).
' See, e.g., FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF AccoUNTIN--INTERMEDIATE 131
(6th ed. 1965) ; WixoN, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 2123 (4th ed. 1964).
. See HATFIELD, SURPLUS AND DIVIDENDS 27 (1943).
' See LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 474 (1959). Query if the New Act really achieves
this result when a likely result of its provisions will be a write-off of the discount
account which clearly sets forth the fact of contingent liability by holders of watered
shares. See WixoN, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOKc 21.22 (4th ed. 1964).
If the suggestions made previously are adopted, creditors would be protected by
the bankruptcy insolvency test, see text accompanying note 382 supra, and by the statu-
tory right of suit for water in the event of insolvency. See part I, 41 WASH. L. REV.
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allow solvent corporations to sue holders of watered shares either for
the amount of the water or cancellation, depending on the equities of
the situation5 6 It thus seems that a solution closer to the accountants'
view would be more consistent with dividend policy than the New Act's
conclusionY57 Possibly the accounting result could be reached simply
by interpreting the New Act to permit a stated capital offset account,
but better resolution of the problem would be obtained by specific
statutory recognition of a discount on stated capital account, which
could be eliminated only by collection or reduction of stated capital.
c. Some Basic Policy Questions. The question previously post-
poned, whether accounting valuations should be used in making legal
determinations as to the available dividend fund, may now be con-
sidered. Seward' and Gibson,"" members of the ABA committee
responsible for drafting the Model Act, have both taken the position
that the appropriate value standard for dividend questions under that
act is "current value." Even if the previous discussion is ignored,
however, substantial objections to a "current value" standard can be
raised. The first, and most important, is that determinations of "cur-
rent value" will involve directors and courts in the complex and sub-
207, 255-60. The preferred shareholders' liquidation preference would also be protected,
see text accompanying note 389 supra, but their interests are not protected in the
event of insolvency. See part I, 41 WASH. L. RE%. 207, 256. For a discussion of the
possible harms to the interest of preferred shareholders in the circumstances, see DODD
& BAKER, CASES ON Cou'oRATioNs 997-99 (2d ed. 1951).
See in this regard part I, 41 WAsH. L. REv. 207, 258 n. 307. A court under such
a statute could presumably permit guilty shareholders still in the corporation to offset
future dividend declarations against their watered shares' liability.
' Sections (1) and (2) of WAsHa. REv. CODE § 23A.08420 (1965), permitting
"nimble" dividends and dividends by wasting asset corporations without deduction
for depletion both point in the direction of the conclusion suggested in the text. For
discussion thereof, see part III under the headings "Nimble Dividends" and "Divi-
dends By Wasting Asset Corporations."
It may be argued,of course, that pursuing the earnings concept for dividends in
these circumstances ignores much of the legal thinking to the effect that legal capital
is a quantum rather than a res. See, e.g., Ballantine & Hills, Corporate Capital and
Restrictions Upon Diidends Under Modern Corporation Laws, 23 CALIF. L. Rsv.
229, 234 (1935) ; Gose, Legal Significance of "Capital Stock," 32 WAS . L. REV. 1, 5
passin (1957). But the accountant's thesis does not go this far since it would act to
preserve in the corporation not the res of the original assets but an amount equal to
their original fair market value.
' Seward, Earned Surplus-Its Meani:ng and Use in The Model Business Corpor-
ation Act, 38 VA. L. REv. 435, 440 (1952).
1 Gibson, Surplus, So What?, 17 Bus. LAW. 476, 487 (1962). For the statutory
basis of Gibson's argument, see note 364 supra. Garrett, Capital and Surplus Under
77w New Corporation Statutes, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 239, 259 (1958), seems to
be of the same general view.
Gibson, however, goes on to argue eloquently for a dividend test based upon earn-
ings. See Gibson, supra at 490-94. As should be clear by now, it is the author's posi-
tion that this is precisely the test presented under the Model (New) Act's earned
surplus test. Cf. HEPwITz, BUSINESSPLANING 339 (1966).
19661
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
jective process of valuing a corporation's assets. 60 A second related
objection arises because generally accepted accounting principles are
not based on current values and, as a result, dividend determinations
would be made and reported on a basis incompatible with the firm's
earnings as reported to shareholders and creditors."' A third and final
objection is that the statement that a "current value" standard is to
be used in connection with the Model Act ignores the focus in the act
" See, e.g., BAKER & CARY, CASES ON CORPORATIONS 1195-96 (3d rnabr. ed. 1958) ;
Hackney, Accounting Principles In Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTETP. PROB.
791, 819-21 (1965), who states a number of the difficult questions that must be an-
swered in connection with determining "current values." 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION
OF PROPERTY 973-74 (1937), states:
but [a current value test] presents such serious practical difficulties of valuaticn
that we doubt the wisdom of attempting to enforce it with respect to most types of
corporations. It would impose on the directors the duty, period after period, of re-
determining the value of their business enterprise in order to decide whether, and
to what extent, there is an equity in excess of stated capital. Only with corpora-
tions whose assets are of a highly marketable form, as with insurance companies
and investment trusts holding liquid securities in their portfolios, would this pro-
cedure of revaluation be feasible. To demand of the directors of the United States
Steel Corporation, or of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company, or of the
Pennsylvania Railroad Company, that they shall make their dividend payments
depend on an ascertainment of the current value of their Whole business-for no
mere summation of the so-called "values" of the separate assets would suffice-is to
impose upon them a task that no responsible businessman should be asked to assume.
But see the opinion of the court in Randall v. Bailey, 23 N.Y.S.2d 173, 184 (1940),
aff'd without opinion, 29 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1st Dept. 1941), aff'd, 288 N.Y. 280, 43 N.E.2d
43 (1942), stating:
I see no cause for alarm over the fact that this view requires directors to make a
determination of the value of the assets at each dividend declaration. On the con-
trary, I think that is exactly what the law alvays has contemplated that directors
should do. That does not mean that the books themselves necessarily must be al-
tered by write-ups or write-downs at each dividend period, or that formal apprais-
als must be obtained from professional appraisers or even made by the directors
themselves. That is obviously impossible in the case of corporations of any con-
siderable size. But it is not impossible nor unfeasible for directors to consider
whether the cost of assets continues over a long period of years to reflect their fair
value, and the law does require that directors should really direct in the very im-
portant matter of really determining at each dividend declaration whether or not
the value of the assets is such as to justify a dividend, rather than do what one
director here testified that he did, viz. "accept the company's figures." The direc-
tors are the ones who should determine the figures by carefully considering values,
and it was for the very purpose of compelling them to perform that duty that the
statute imposes upon them a personal responsibility for declaring and paying div-
idends when the value of the assets is not sufficient to justify them. What directors
must do is to exercise an informed judgment of their own, and the amount of in-
formation which they should obtain, and the sources from which they should obtain
it, will of course depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.
1 Annual reports, and newspaper accounts thereof, are virtually the only means
by which shareholders and creditors receive detailed financial information about a
corporation. If these individuals make some effort to determine that dividends are
not being paid from capital, as they should, they will be able to make such determina-
tions only by the presence of extensive supplementary reports reconciling dividend
determining data with the accountants statement of earnings. Such data could, of
course, be provided (though few directors would seem desirous of having to reduce
their divideni deliberations to writing) but absent a statutory requirement it seems
most unlikely that it will be provided.
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upon accumulated earnings rather than upon a surplus of current asset
values over liabilities and stated capital. 62
If these objections are not sufficient reason for rejecting current
values as a standard, the preceding discussion should have demon-
strated the difficulties in merely using current values without attempt-
ing to distinguish price-level changes from changes in replacement
costs. Even if the value changes do not involve changes in the value
of the dollar, general recognition of changes in replacement cost, where
the changes are not realized, does not appear to be sound dividend
policy. It may be argued, however, that replacement costs should be
used in the process of determining a corporation's income for dividend
purposes 0 3 But such a move would mean a change in the concept of
capital from the traditional legal notion of capital as a quantum equal
to shareholders' dollar contributions for par or stated value shares to
an economic concept in which the basic productive capacity of the
enterprise must be maintained before there could be any net income. 64
However desirable the maintenance of economic capital may be as a
long-term objective, 6' the reluctance of accountants to venture into
the field suggests that objective techniques for accomplishing these
results are not currently available."6 Hence it would seem that even
in this area dividend determinations should be made on the basis of
traditional accounting data, historical cost, modified by price-level
indices.567
" See 2 BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 974-75 (1937) ; Hackney, Accounting
Principles in Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 791, 821 (1965).
' See, e.g., materials in AMORY & HARDEE, MATERIALS ON ACCOUNTING 271-89 (3d
ed. 1958); cf. EDWARDS & BELL, THE THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF BUSINESS IN-
COmE 110-15 (1964); SPROUSE & MOONITZ, A Tentative Set of Broad Accounting
Principles For Business Enterprises, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 3, at 23-36,
55 (1962); Soloman, Current-Cost Accounting, Ill. C.P.A., Autumn 1965, p. 22;
AmERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATION COIMITTEE ON CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS, Ac-
COUNTING AND REPORTING STATEMENTS FOR CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND
PRECEDING STATEMENTS AND SUPPLEMENTS 6 (1957) ; Zlatkovich, A New Accounting
Theory Statement, J. ACCOUNTANCY, Aug. 1966, p. 31, 34.
- See Hackney, Accounting Principles In Corporation Law, 30 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 791, 810-11 (1965).
""'For possible arguments against use of replacement costs, see STAFF OF ACCOUNT-
ING RESEARCH DIVISION, Reporting The Financial Effects of Price Level Chatges,
ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 6, at 6-7 (1963).
"" Even the authors of Accounting Research Study No. 3, Sprouse and Moonitz,
seem to admit that satisfactory indexes of construction costs and of machinery and
equipment prices are not currently available. SPROUSE & MoomiTz, op. cit. supra note
563, at 34. See also Hendriksen, Purchasing Power and Replacement Cost Cotwepts-
Are They Related, 38 ACCOUNTING REv. 435 (1963).
"This is not to suggest that from a financial standpoint management need not
take into account current replacement costs in determining the size of any dividend.
This should be an aspect of the directors' fiduciary duty to maintain the economic
health of the company. See discussion in text infra part III under the heading "Direc-
tor and Shareholder Liability"
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This is not to say that involvement of generally accepted accounting
principles in dividend fund determinations does not itself present
some problems. One long-time problem with such references has been
the difficulty in determining precisely which accounting procedures
were generally accepted. 6 This problem to some extent has been
alleviated by the creation of the Accounting Principles Board by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'" whose opinions
have the effect of the substantial authoritative support necessary for a
principle to be generally accepted.57 0 Unfortunately, accounting prin-
ciples can also have substantial authoritative support (and thus be
generally accepted) despite significant variation from Board opinions,
though extensive deviations are deterred by disclosures required if
principles contrary to Board opinions are followedY.17  Even if Board
opinions were deemed to constitute generally accepted principles, how-
ever, a scanning of the previous footnotes should indicate that fre-
quently the opinions provide no answer to a particular question and
that consultation of other general accounting sources is necessary.
Another problem with the use of accounting principles is that fre-
quently a wide range of alternative accounting procedures is generally
acceptable,5 71 which means in essence that a corporation's income is
similarly capable of a wide range. It is to be hoped that in the future
the range of alternatives will be narrowed and that in the meantime
' GRADY, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles For Business
Enterprises, ACCOUNTING RESEARCH STUDY No. 7, at 52-53 (1965), equates (as does
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, see AICPA, Disclostre of
Departures From Opinion of the Accounting Principles Board, Special Bull. 1964)
generally accepted accounting principles with accounting practices which have sub-
stantial authority back of them. The sources for determining whether an accounting
practice has substantial authoritative support are: (1) practices commonly found in
business; (2) requirements and views of stock exchanges and commercial and
investment bankers; (3) regulatory commissions' uniform systems of accounts and
rulings (though departures from generally accepted principles are to be disclosed) ; (4)
regulations and accounting releases of the SEC; (5) opinions of practicing and aca-
demic certified public accountants; and (6) opinions by the committees of the American
Accounting Association and the American Institute of CPA's.
' The Board was established in April 1959 for the specific purpose of preparing
a statement of the basic postulates and of the broad principles of accounting. For
a lengthy discussion of the Board, see Sprouse & Vagts, The Accounting Principles
Board and Differences and Inconsistencies In Accounting Practice: An Interimn
Appraisal, 30 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoa. 706 (1965).
'°AICPA, Disclosure of Departures From Opinions of The Accounting Prin-
ciples Board, Special Bull. 1964.
' Ibid.2For example, AICPA REsEAR H BULL. No. 43 permits cost for inventory
purposes to be determined under any one of several assumptions as to the flow of
cost factors, such as FIFO, LIFO, or average costs. AICPA REsExcH BULL. No. 43,
ch. 4, statement 4 (1953). And generally accepted methods for computing depreciation
on fixed assets range from the straight-line method to declining-balance depreciation.
See AICPA, ACCOUNTING TERMINOLOGY BULL. No. 1, ff 56 (1953) ; AICPA REs&URcH
-BULL. No. 44 (Revised) (1957).
[ VOL. 42 : 119
WASHINGTON BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
insistence on consistency in application of principles will reduce in-
tracorporate deviations7M These problems and the instances previ-
ously noted in which the results under accounting principles do not
coincide with sound dividend policy suggest that the answer to the
second question previously reserved-whether the statute should spe-
cifically state the extent of its reliance on generally accepted account-
ing principles-should be no. Accounting principles, however helpful
in dividend determinations, are in the process of evolution and refine-
ment, and there is no guarantee that the eventual principles will
correlate well enough with dividend policy to deserve current incor-
poration in the statute. 74
' Fortunately, the prime purpose of dividend regulation is not to compare
corporation's performance with that of another in the same line but rather to
attempt to resolve conflicting legal interests in the distribution of dividends. Cf.
Sprouse & Vagts, supra note 569, at 723. In the latter pursuit, many accounting varia-
tions will be less important where consistently applied.
" See in this connection the following statement in SPROUSE & MOONITZ, A Tenta-
tive Set of Broad Accounting Principles For Business Enterprises, AccoUNING
RESEARCH STrUDY No. 3, at 10 (1962):
In order to make the transition from the postulates as set forth above to the
principles developed in this study, some additional steps are necessary. The
first is a clear recognition that broad principles must transcend the historical
limitations of profits "available for dividends" or "subject to income tax'
This is not to say that the effects of dividends and of taxes should be ignored;
to do so would ignore a significant part of the environment in which accounting
operates. Rather the task is to formulate those principles which will enable us to
measure the resources held by specific entities and the related changes before
consideration of taxes and dividends. The measurements should be independent
of the dividend and the tax questions but, at the same time, should facilitate the
solution of those questions, as well as of others related to financial position and
operating results. Put another way, broad principles of accounting should not
be formulated mainly for the purpose of making good, or validating, so to speak,
the principles of sound dividend or tax policy.

